Better pack it in then. We’ve got no chance. Our oponent said so, and you can’t argue with that.
/s…just in case
Given that US can’t even win a war against Yemen, it’s pretty clear that burger empire has no business trying to take on China. Not to mention that US has lost every one of their own simulated conflicts in South China sea. Of course, we all know that burgerlanders lack the intelligence and wisdom to learn from their debacles, and will cheerfully rush into a war in China.
The US isn’t at “war” with Yemen.
All the bombing of Yemen US has been doing sure fooled me.
No no no, you got it all wrong. Using drones/planes to kill military (and pretty often civilian) targets on another country’s territory is an act of war only if you are not the US.
Otherwise how could they keep track of all the countries they would be at war with…
😀
You sound like fun! How can I subscribe to your blog?
On the contrary, I believe that burgerlanders are well aware of the disparity. The United States will not engage China in direct military conflict. Within Chinese circles, there is a broader perception that the U.S. military understands China best when it comes to handling issues related to China. I feel the U.S. military is somewhat cautious on matters concerning China, often appearing to perform for public opinion, fulfilling a duty. China itself is inclined not to engage in military confrontation with the United States (while always prepared to defend against U.S. military attacks), and military exchanges will continue to exist. China hopes either to force U.S. military intervention directly in the Middle East or Ukraine or to expose the U.S. through repeated instances of providing security, directly confronting the United States and revealing that the security it provides is mere empty promises, as seen with the Philippines. Through such actions, China aims to dismantle the myth of U.S. “security guarantees” solidified by the military-backed U.S. dollar hegemony, dealing it a severe blow.
Through such actions, China aims to dismantle the myth of U.S. “security guarantees” solidified by the military-backed U.S. dollar hegemony, dealing it a severe blow.
Now that’s a task. Myth of US security guarantees is dismantled visibly ever since Vietnam and has been repeatedly dismantled again and again ever since, but there still are governments that believe it. Or are comprador enough to do it anyway (i strongly suspect it is the latter, no one can be this dumb).
I do hope you’re right because a direct conflict between US and China would be cataclysmic for the whole world. I also agree that US military likely understands that this wouldn’t end well for them, but it seems that the political class in US is completely unhinged. There’s also little sign that their puppets administering the island learned all the wrong lessons going by these statements https://inews.co.uk/news/world/taiwan-learning-ukraine-china-attack-3122942
I do think China will try to avoid a military confrontation, but there are red lines like putting missiles in Taiwan that would force China to act.
I believe that in the United States, the relationship between the military and politicians is more of a balancing act rather than absolute subordination. For instance, during the transition between the Trump and Biden administrations, representatives of the U.S. military independently assured China that they would not launch nuclear weapons against China and would inform China of Trump’s military decisions. Such actions would be considered inconceivable in China, as it essentially means the military is operating outside the president’s control (Trump was still president at the time).
In ancient China, there was an event known as “Huang Pao Jia Shen” (Yellow Robe Incident), which highlighted the consequences of the military’s actual controller and the nominal controller being different individuals. Similar to the helicopters used for government investigations of military audits that always seem to “crash accidentally,” only to result in no conclusive outcomes, I think the U.S. military can be seen as akin to the “Fanzhen” or “Jiedushi” (regional military governors) of the Tang Dynasty in China. If politicians were to order the U.S. military to fight an unwinnable war, we might witness the military disobeying orders and the politicians “accidentally” meeting their demise.
China plans to complete the construction of a cross-sea bridge to Taiwan by 2035, and I believe the reunification of China could happen in the next few years. Due to the “de-Sinicization education” in Taiwan, the younger generation no longer sees themselves as Chinese. On Chinese domestic social media, the viewpoint of “retaining the island without retaining the people” has significant traction (mostly said in moments of anger). I believe the CPC (Communist Party of China) will not make Taiwan the main battleground. Instead, they might encircle but not attack.If the U.S. intervenes, they could attack U.S. assets in the first island chain, forcing the U.S. out of the Asia-Pacific region. If the U.S. does not intervene, it would essentially signal the collapse of the myth of U.S. military guarantees. This would shatter Taiwan’s illusions about the U.S., leading Taiwan to undergo a self-revolution and eventually join China.
I do think that US military is far more sober than US politicians, so let’s hope that they really have some leverage within the system and can put their foot down when push comes to shove. Otherwise, we’re very likely headed for a nuclear holocaust.
The simulated conflicts are run against an adversary that is perfect. No logistic errors, no maintenance issues, no communication issues, no human error. They are a teaching tool, not a crystal ball. In reality, in the event of a conflict there are plenty of areas where China would struggle.
And of course none of these problems would apply to burger empire who would have to attack China from across the ocean requiring far more complex supply chains. I mean just look how well burgerlander proxy war against Russia is going.
Those problems would absolutely apply. And moving equipment has never been a problem in Ukraine, it has been getting permission from a fickle Congress and training Ukrainian with gear they are not familiar with.
Moving equipment across complex supply lines has absolutely been a problem, and many commentators have talks about how much more difficult it is for US to ship weapons to Ukraine than for Russia. This should be obvious, yet here we are.
The other perspective is that defence is much easier in the information era. If the US couldn’t win against Yemen, what makes you think China could win against Taiwan?
You just have to look at a map to understand that. For starters, Taiwan imports over 90% of its energy. China just needs to blockade trade for Taiwan and the economy there will collapse overnight. Taiwan being an island makes it much harder to US to assist it as well, and US would be acting as the attacker in this scenario because China can launch missiles from the mainland just the same way Yemen does, while US would be forced to move assets from far away.
Full text
The US and China resumed semi-official nuclear arms talks in March for the first time in five years, with Beijing’s representatives telling US counterparts that they would not resort to atomic threats over Taiwan, according to two American delegates who attended.
The Chinese representatives offered reassurances after their US interlocutors raised concerns that China might use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons if it faced defeat in a conflict over Taiwan. Beijing views the democratically governed island as its territory, a claim rejected by the government in Taipei.
“They told the US side that they were absolutely convinced that they are able to prevail in a conventional fight over Taiwan without using nuclear weapons,” said scholar David Santoro, the US organiser of the Track Two talks, the details of which are being reported by Reuters for the first time.
Participants in Track Two talks are generally former officials and academics who can speak with authority on their government’s position, even if they are not directly involved with setting it. Government-to-government negotiations are known as Track One.
Washington was represented by about half a dozen delegates, including former officials and scholars at the two-day discussions, which took place in a Shanghai hotel conference room.
Beijing sent a delegation of scholars and analysts, which included several former People’s Liberation Army officers.
A State Department spokesperson said in response to Reuters’ questions that Track Two talks could be “beneficial”. The department did not participate in the March meeting though it was aware of it, the spokesperson said.
Such discussions cannot replace formal negotiations “that require participants to speak authoritatively on issues that are often highly compartmentalized within (Chinese) government circles,” the spokesperson said.
Members of the Chinese delegation and Beijing’s defence ministry did not respond to requests for comment.
The informal discussions between the nuclear-armed powers took place with the US and China at odds over major economic and geopolitical issues, with leaders in Washington and Beijing accusing each other of dealing in bad faith.
The two countries briefly resumed Track One talks over nuclear arms in November but those negotiations have since stalled, with a top US official publicly expressing frustration at China’s responsiveness.
The Pentagon, which estimates that Beijing’s nuclear arsenal increased by more than 20% between 2021 and 2023, said in October that China “would also consider nuclear use to restore deterrence if a conventional military defeat in Taiwan” threatened CCP rule.
China has never renounced the use of force to bring Taiwan under its control and has over the past four years stepped up military activity around the island.
The Track Two talks are part of a two-decade nuclear weapons and posture dialogue that stalled after the Trump administration pulled funding in 2019.
After the COVID-19 pandemic, semi-official discussions resumed on broader security and energy issues, but only the Shanghai meeting dealt in detail with nuclear weapons and posture.
Santoro, who runs the Hawaii-based Pacific Forum think-tank, described “frustrations” on both sides during the latest discussions but said the two delegations saw reason to continue talking. More discussions were being planned in 2025, he said. No first-use?
The US Department of Defense estimated last year that Beijing has 500 operational nuclear warheads and will probably field more than 1,000 by 2030.
That compares to 1,770 and 1,710 operational warheads deployed by the US and Russia respectively. The Pentagon said that by 2030, much of Beijing’s weapons will likely be held at higher readiness levels.
Since 2020, China has also modernised its arsenal, starting production of its next-generation ballistic missile submarine, testing hypersonic glide vehicle warheads and conducting regular nuclear-armed sea patrols.
Weapons on land, in the air and at sea give China the “nuclear triad” – a hallmark of a major nuclear power.
A key point the US side wanted to discuss, according to Santoro, was whether China still stood by its no-first-use and minimal deterrence policies, which date from the creation of its first nuclear bomb in the early 1960s.
Minimal deterrence refers to having just enough atomic weapons to dissuade adversaries.
China is also one of two nuclear powers – the other being India – to have pledged not to initiate a nuclear exchange. Chinese military analysts have speculated that the no-first-use policy is conditional – and that nuclear arms could be used against Taiwan’s allies – but it remains Beijing’s stated stance.
Santoro said the Chinese delegates told US representatives that Beijing maintained these policies and that “‘we are not interested in reaching nuclear parity with you, let alone superiority.'”
“‘Nothing has changed, business as usual, you guys are exaggerating’,” Santoro said in summarising Beijing’s position. ‘Risk and opacity’
Top US arms control official Bonnie Jenkins told Congress in May that China had not responded to nuclear-weapons risk reduction proposals that Washington raised during last year’s formal talks.
China has yet to agree to further government-to-government meetings.
Bejing’s “refusal to substantively engage” in discussions over its nuclear build-up raises questions around its “already ambiguous stated “no-first-use” policy and its nuclear doctrine more broadly,” the State Department spokesperson told Reuters.
Alberque of the Henry Stimson Centre said that China relied heavily on “risk and opacity” to mitigate US nuclear superiority and there was “no imperative” for Beijing to have constructive discussions.
China’s expanded arsenal – which includes anti-ship cruise missiles, bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarines – exceeded the needs of a state with a minimal deterrence and no-first-use policy, Alberque said.
(Edited by Georgi Gotev)
Sure, and I would prevail in a fistfight against Saitama.
