So some fellow with an odd name joins one of our foreigner wechat groups. Says he’s from Ukraine. Someone posts an ad for what we used to call a white monkey job, a day’s modeling for cash. Mostly ended as the government cracked down hard on illegal work. He asked if it could be permanent employment and he could get a work visa with it. No, those jobs never are. People had plenty of them back in the day, you’d see people you know in trade show videos, hotel advertisements and the like. Another insensitive prick in the group cackled, well, it’s not illegal work if you have a green card like I do! The Ukrainian then asked how he could form his own company to issue his own work visa but the government cracked down on phony companies like that long ago. Have to have investment, a physical premises, money going in and out and employ Chinese people. As for a China green card, it’s one of the most difficult in the world to get. If you’re a Ph.D. in AI research you can get one. Or a very highly paid professional job that pays a ton of taxes. Or after five years of marriage to a PRC citizen and continuous residence you can get one, if you buy an apartment (outright with cash or have a mortgage completely paid off and banks don’t like to give loans to foreigners because too many up and leave.) Plus put down a deposit of ten years living expenses ($50,000 or so.) Also survive five years with no work as spousal visas are really meant for Chinese men who marry Vietnamese or North Korean women so why does she need to work? It’s not meant for whitey but the Lawful Neutral Confucians will allow it if you can come up with a convincing story as to why you can live in China without a job. He’s probably on a tourist visa so he’s got 30 days to find something, which he probably won’t be able to. It’s a sad story. If he overstays he’ll get picked up by the cops and deported at his own expense. If he can’t afford a ticket he’ll languish in immigration jail, once a year or so the commies will pay for a flight home for indigent illegal aliens. I had a friend who was in there after getting picked up for playing guitar at a bar for pay. He said it was unpleasant, bright, wooden benches as a bed and food was terrible, whole fish with tiny bones, rice and boiled cabbage. A few years ago after the war started we had a bunch of Ukrainian young men show up, which I thought was odd but we get people from all over the world so I didn’t think much of it. Looking back they were draft dodgers. They’re all gone now, I haven’t seen one in years.
the narrative in question only comes “from western intelligence” in the sense, that much of the information is from declassified intelligence documents. in other words: it’s the us government planning shit in secret and then releasing that info at a later point when it can be reasonably shure nobody important cares any longer. as for proof, i believed the iran-contra scandal to be well-known enough to forego explaination, but in short, the whole scheme involved china sending soviet-style arms via iran and israel, both for the purpose of interoperability with captured arms from the sandinistas, as well as plausible deniability. here is american media reporting on the sales during the investigation in 1987, a time when neither washington, nor langley had much reason to try to isolate one of its de facto allies in the crusade against what reagan called the “evil empire”. a similar policy was conducted in angola, for all the same reasons, with western media reporting chinese aid to the fnla here, this declassified document protocolling american-chinese discussion of aid to anti-communist forces, and this resource stating that chinese arms sales to savimbis forces amounted to $800 million. savimbi also visited china in 1964, as well as later points and recieved military training in the country.
as in regards to pinochet, not only was china one of but two socialist nations not to break relations with chile after the coup (the other being ceaușescus romania), but it also went as far as to expell the previous ambassador, armando uribe, after he criticized the junta. the two countries had close economic ties (source in russian) and supported each other at the un. peking also reportadly gave the dictator personally millions of dollars, as well as attempting to establish military relations with santiago.
in regards to the illegal and undemocratic dissulution of the ussr, i may have formulated my point a little unclearly: of course there were a number of severe internal problems, there is absolutely no denying that and i’ve stated as much in my original comment. but external factors should’nt be ignored. said factors were not chinas “criticism” of the soviets’ dubious “great power chauvenism”, but rather chinas concrete material actions post-1963 and especially after 1972, as well as the consequences said actions entailed. in my opinion siding with the japanese (!) on the kuril islands dispute, giving guns to reactionary landlords in afghanistan and building such extensive ties with the cia, by helping them build anti-soviet espionage stations in northern china (project chestnut), that deng even got an exclusive tour of langley, was much more than mere ideological criticism, however valid parts of that criticism may have been
as in regards to palestine, israel and the wider middle east, the chinese rôle in ensuring irans survival, as well as its historic aid to certain palestinian liberation movements should of course be viewed as a very positive thing and celebrated, yet it is important to not view the world with rose-tinted glasses:
china does no support the full withdrawal of the occupation from palestinian land, as all “israeli” territory is stolen palestinian land, with israel being an illegal settler colonial occupation. instead, beijing supports the so-called “two states solution”.
the quote from mao in regards to trade not equalling support was obviously the correct line back when china was a weak, impoverished nation relying on foreign assistance and thus not in a position of picking trade partners. this is no longer the case.
china, nowadays one of the largest, if not the largest, economies worldwide, being one of israels main trading partners means that they are one of the main suppliers of the occupations wealth and thus to a certain degree complicit in the economic aspects of genocide. if the prc were to hypothetically withdraw from trade with them, the entity would experience a dramatic reduction in living standards and a lot of the settlers would probably leave.
and this isnt even a radical thing to demand! towards the end of the apartheid régime in south africa, even western capitalist governments began boycotting and sanctioning pretoria. isnt it understandable then, that i kinda expect a socialist government that is literally in control of the worlds largest economy to give up on some profits in order to not support a genocide? bds should go both ways.
and let’s also not ignore the numerous historical cases of open sino-israeli co-operation in military and economic matters since the 1980s: both chinese, like renmin ribao, as well as israeli sources like the jerusalem post or the tower magazine, as well as joint chinese-israeli websites like this one, have confirmations of this.
finally, the arakhamia quote was reported in a very uncritical fashion by chinas xinhua news agencies’ russian edition, in a manner that is imho a little hard to not interpret as tacit endorcement, especially from an agency that historically been so great at poking holes in soviet argumentation.
full text of the xinhua article from july 7th 2021
Kyiv, July 7 /Xinhua/ – Ukraine’s ruling party, “Servant of the People,” considers China an important strategic partner and intends to draw on the experience of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in economic management and state-building. This was stated recently in an interview with Chinese media by David Arakhamia, head of the “Servant of the People” Political Council.
He noted that the CPC recently celebrated the 100th anniversary of its founding and congratulated its leadership and all Chinese people on this momentous occasion.
The head of the Servant of the People Political Council emphasized that the principles of the ruling parties of Ukraine and China largely coincide, as their motto is serving the people.
D. Arakhamia highly praised the fact that, despite China’s vast territory, the CPC is represented in every settlement across the country—from small villages to large cities. This experience must certainly be emulated, according to the head of the “Servant of the People” Political Council.
A year ago, D. Arakhamia read the book “Xi Jinping on State Governance” in Russian, which made a strong impression on him. He decided to facilitate the publication of a Ukrainian-language edition of this book so that Ukrainians could learn how China overcame difficulties and achieved rapid economic growth.
In his view, the “Chinese miracle” was made possible by the long-term stability of the policies pursued by the CCP. China clearly articulates its plans and steadfastly implements them; even amid the novel coronavirus pandemic (COVID-19), the PRC has managed to maintain high rates of economic growth.
D. Arakhamia noted that Ukraine hopes to adopt China’s positive experience in the field of economic development. According to him, reports that a hospital was erected in the PRC in a matter of days and a bridge was built in a matter of months sound like science fiction to Ukrainians, since in Ukraine, in such a short time, one can barely make a decision to implement a project and prepare the technical documentation.
In this regard, China serves as a model and strategic partner for Ukraine in the country’s modernization. Over the ten years since the establishment of their strategic partnership, Ukraine and China have achieved outstanding results in various areas of cooperation. Currently, China is Ukraine’s largest trading partner. Official Kyiv highly values the opportunity to participate in China’s “Belt and Road” initiative, which strengthens Ukraine’s transit potential, and sees great prospects in cooperation with China in areas such as education, tourism, and culture.
The head of the “Servant of the People” Political Council noted that China is a popular destination for many Ukrainian tourists. Ukraine is currently negotiating with Chinese officials to resume direct flights between the two countries, with the aim of making travel to China more convenient.
D. Arakhamia also expressed hope that once the COVID-19 pandemic situation improves, Ukraine and China will resume exchanging delegations to further strengthen mutual trust and accelerate bilateral cooperation.
the large amount of sino-russian trade is imho much more easily explsined by the presence of the two states’ over 40000 kilometre long border, which ukraine lacks. it is also worth mentioning, that certain chinese banks have been abiding with western sanctions on the russian financial sector, causing difficulties for the latter.
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That is speculation, not analysis. I actually agree with the normative point that I wish China were more militantly anti-Israel and would impose much harsher measures. But your counterfactual is still unsupported. Unless you are prepared to argue for a simultaneous rupture with the far larger US and EU support structure, you have not shown that a unilateral Chinese cutoff would fundamentally change the balance. The actual material record suggests otherwise. China’s current line is contradictory: civilian trade with Israel on one side, while on the other side China continues the relationship that helps keep Iran economically afloat under sanctions (dual use components, rocket precursor, BeiDou access, sanctions avoidance). The regional picture is not remotely captured by your one-dimensional indictment.
This is the best normative criticism you make. It is entirely reasonable to say that China should be more militant against Israel. I agree with that criticism. But that is a very different claim from saying China’s anti-imperialist positions are therefore fraudulent in essence. The first is a real socialist criticism. The second is the same old leap from contradiction to essence.
No one is ignoring them. But you still refuse to distinguish contradiction from principal line. A socialist state operating inside a world market dominated by imperialism will have contradictory external relations. The task is to rank them. China sells civilian goods to Israel. The US arms and bankrolls Israel on a scale that dwarfs everyone else. The EU is Israel’s biggest trade partner. China also buys the overwhelming majority of Iran’s exported oil, blunting unilateral sanctions and helping sustain the main regional state confronting Israel and US power. That is the contradictory material record. Your method erases contradiction because it wants a single moral verdict.
No, it is actually very easy not to interpret it that way. Reporting what a foreign party official said in routine, uncritical diplomatic style is not tacit ideological endorsement. It is state media reporting a foreign politician’s flattering remarks during a period of normal bilateral relations. If mere uncritical reporting equals endorsement, then every state outlet on earth is endorsing half the nonsense it republishes from foreign dignitaries. This point is extremely weak. You are taking banal diplomatic coverage and trying to squeeze ideological essence out of it.
First, the number is wrong by an order of magnitude. The China-Russia border is about 4,200 to 4,300 kilometers, not over 40,000. Second, proximity explains some trade everywhere. That does not make the trade politically meaningless. Reuters, citing Chinese customs, reported that China-Russia trade reached a record $244.8 billion in 2024 despite sanctions-related payment friction. So your attempt to wave it away as just “they share a border” does not work. The scale itself matters. And it also undermines your own bad habit of treating trade volume as decisive proof of strategic identity when it suits you, then dismissing it when it cuts the other way.
Yes, and that should be criticized. But again, contradiction does not equal essence. Some Chinese banks limiting exposure under sanctions pressure shows the pressures imposed by participation in a world financial system still dominated by imperialist institutions. It does not cancel the broader record of very large China-Russia trade ties and repeated Chinese opposition to unilateral sanctions.
What this all comes down to is method. Where your evidence is strongest, it supports serious but limited criticisms. China’s late anti-Soviet turn produced opportunist and at times reactionary alignments. China backed the wrong forces in Angola, above all the FNLA and to a lesser degree UNITA. China maintained relations with Pinochet’s Chile. China diplomatically supports a limited two-state line while materially supporting the opposition as opposed to being more openly and actively militant against Israel. These are all valid subjects of communist criticism.
But you are not content with criticism. You want condemnation. So every error has to become an essence. Every tactical convergence has to become strategic identity. Every trade relation has to become political endorsement. Every diplomatic article has to become ideological affinity. Every real contradiction inside the socialist camp has to be rewritten as proof that one side was fraudulent from the beginning.
That is not dialectical and historical materialism. It is dogmatic nostalgia regarding the USSR, moral accounting regarding China, and an inability to distinguish principal from secondary contradictions. It is exactly why you keep overstating China’s role in the collapse of the USSR. Ideological decay, bureaucratic stagnation, political capitulation, and the rise of Gorbachev and Yeltsin destroyed the Soviet Union. China did not do that. At most, certain Chinese policies formed part of an already hostile international environment. To elevate that into a major causal explanation is not analysis. It is displacement.
A materialist approach would do the opposite of what you do. It would periodize. It would rank contradictions. It would criticize China’s real errors sharply without pretending those errors retroactively abolish every real contradiction with Moscow, erase the anti-imperialist content of the Chinese revolution, or prove that socialism with Chinese characteristics is somehow merely a mask for imperial alignment. Until you can make those distinctions, you are not doing Marxist analysis. You are prosecuting China and calling the indictment “materialism.”
please allow me first to adress a few of your points in your initial reply to my first part, that i hadn’t yet managed to formulate proper responses to prior. i’m sorry for making this whole discussion so cumbersome and inconvenient to sort through, this was by no means my intention.
the line guiding chinese foreign policy may have been motivated by the best anti-imperialist intentions, but its de facto outcomes remain quite evident: not only accomodation, but at times outright collaboration with western imperialism! the material impact of beijings foreign policy, beyond the human cost, was an objective weakening of many socialist states, as well as the communist movement as a whole. simultaneously, beijings historical domestic policy of increasingly allowing western capital penetration strengthened global capitalism by providing it with new markets and helping shift production from the imperial core to the periphery.
notably, much of chinese foreign policy was conducted under assumptions, that were seen as mistaken by most other socialist nations, like that capitalism had supposedly been restored in the ussr, a ridiculous notion given how actual capital restoration in the region during the late 80s/early 90s went, or, also quite dubiously, that the soviet union had at some point turned imperialist. in that case, what capital did it export? by what financial oligarchy was it controlled? what colonies or neo-colonies did it posess?
please correct me if i’m wrong, but as far as i know, neither mao nor any other chinese leader ever really explained what the material basis of a “social-imperialist” state would be, and what the social formation of such a state looked like. to my knowledge, marxism-leninism traditionally holds that the class character of a state changes only through (counter-)revolution, and not through reform alone. with this in mind, it would propably be correct to deem that the theory of “social-imperialism” lacks a material explanation.
it’s far from me to deny that the soviet approach towards other socialist countries had a fair number of problematic aspects to it. yes, there was a certain arrogance towards later revolutions, as well as a certain tendency to see itself as the “older brother guiding the rest”. these attitudes were wrong and they should be criticized. they were also a point of significant frustration for states like bulgaria or cuba, with the notable difference that they didn’t go around offering their territory for the cia, or export guns to afghan reactionaries.
let’s also not pretend like china didn’t launch its own bid to exert influence over communist movements around the world, leading in many cases to local communist parties splitting in two, confusing fellow travelers and weakening the overall communist movement. beijing saying the soviet union had fallen into the trap of “social imperialism” and portraying it as the greatest threat for the proletariat to face, not only constituted an unfortunate and avoidable propaganda service to western imperialism, but also a grave threat to soviet national security. the prc then proceeded to make matters worse by making overtures to the united states and other imperialist powers, ultimately culminating in the 1972 nixon visit to china and the informal alliance between the two countries that followed. “neither moscow, nor washington!” far too often ultimately meant “washington”.
under what material conditions did the soviet union’s involvement in spain, as well as its simultaneous trade relations with the reactionary regimes in europe take place? it was only ca. 15 years after the end of the civil war, electrification and industrialization were far from finished, and while no longer in total diplomatic isolation, the ussr was still essentially under siege. in fact, for most, if not all of its existance, the ussr was under constant, unrelenting and unremitting targeting of much stronger adversaries and thus significantly curtailed in regards to choosing political and economic partners.
meanwhile, modern china enjoys a degree of international political and economic freedom and influence that no previous socialist country would have dared to dream of, with the economies of it’s ideological enemies largely deindustrialized and thus being in a position of unprecedented import dependence.
as i’ve stated previously, the internal problems in the late soviet union were severe and numerous. however, the hostile external environment of constant anti-soviet pressure, as part of which the people’s republic acted, served as a catalyst and breeding ground for precisely those internal ills. foreign antagonism exacerbated and amplified pre-existing issues in regards to fiscal difficulties, delegitimized institutions, empowered reformist critique, and sought to intensify nationalisms. the exorbitant military spending, that had been essentially imposed onto the ussr by it’s adversaries, had severe impacts on quality of life and lent credibility to gorbachevs promises and rhetoric.
all this was of course well known and understood among moscows opponents, with these precise effects being one of the main reasons for conducting all this pressure in the first place.
of course, europe and the united states bear infinitely greater responsibility for israels crimes, since it is, after all, their settler colony. however, it must be noted that nations do not survive through their military alone.
the average settler is accustomed to a certain level of luxury and consumer goods, goods that, due to the deindustrialization of western countries, are now largely produced in china. should these goods become unavailable, the settler would have a strong incentive to return to their home country.
as mentioned earlier, chinese support to the islamic republic is very much commendable, absolutely no denying that. nonetheless, china has scaled back it’s historical involvement with palestinian resistance factions and at certain points, it seemed as though the country had little interest in iran and the broader axis of resistance beyond its own economic interests. the recent strengthening of military co-operation is an extremely happy development, though.
thank you for correcting my mistake about tge length of the border, it’s much appreciated!
the large trade volume, as compared to ukraine, is of course further explained by russias much larger and more sophisticated economy and stronger willingness to rely on non-western partners. nonetheless, reuters also reported, that in 2025 two‑way goods trade fell by ca. 6.9%, compared to the previous year, to ca. $228.1 billion, partially as a result of western pressure.
at least in my view, china does not seem to have taken sides in this conflict, preferring instead to sit on two chairs at once.
finally, at no point have i claimed to know some “essence of Chinese foreign policy as such”, nor do i want to state that chinese socialism is merely a “smokescreen” or something similarly perfidious. in my eyes, the question is less whether or not china intended at any point in time to act as an ally to imperialism, but rather that it de facto oftentimes did. imho, certain aspects of chinese foreign policy have sadly been contributing to the strengthening of reactionary forces worldwide and that should not be sugar-coated.
at no point was it my intention to demean or degrade the positive impact that that the chinese revolution had upon the world, nor have i wanted to call into question the chinese peoples’ and leaderships commitment to socialist construction. if that’s how it came across, it is a reflection on my ability to express myself and my character, not on my point, and i must apologize. short-temperedness is one of my worse traits and one i need to work on.
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No one said declassified US documents are automatically worthless. The issue is the method you apply to them. A declassified US document can establish what US officials discussed, planned, or believed. It cannot by itself settle the truth of the matter.
Even taking this at its strongest, what it proves is limited. It shows Chinese-origin arms sales intersecting with a reactionary geopolitical environment in which the Reagan administration was running Iran-Contra and anti-Sandinista operations. Fine. Criticize that. But this still does not prove your larger original claim that the PRC had become a de facto auxiliary of imperialism in essence. Tactical convergence in one conjuncture is not the same thing as strategic class identity. You keep collapsing those categories because your conclusion is fixed in advance.
Thank you for the sources however the scholarly record is more nuanced than your presentation suggests. The Angola conflict was exceptionally complex, with shifting class characters and alliances. UNITA itself originated with Maoist influences in the early 1960s before later realigning with Washington and Pretoria, a trajectory that itself reflects the contradictory pressures of anti-colonial struggle in a Cold War context. China’s engagement in Angola was real and should be criticized: Beijing provided support to the FNLA and some episodic assistance to UNITA in a specific anti-Soviet conjuncture. But the attempt to inflate this into a simple narrative of “China backing reactionaries” misses the dialectical reality. The principal contradiction for Beijing at that moment was containing Soviet-Vietnamese expansionism, not a strategic alignment with US imperialism. That does not excuse the error. Backing the FNLA against the Soviet-Cuban backed MPLA was a serious mistake with real consequences. But a materialist analysis asks why that error occurred, what contradictions produced it, and how the line was later corrected, not simply compiling damages to prove a pre-established essence. Your $800 million figure for UNITA aid is not firmly established in the scholarly literature you cite, and the emphasis on scale serves your moral indictment more than it serves historical clarity. The point stands without embellishment: in a specific period, China’s anti-Soviet strategic conception led it to support forces that objectively served reactionary ends. That should be criticized. But criticism is not the same as extracting an eternal essence from a contingent error.
Yes. That is part of the record. And it should be criticized. But once again, contact, training, and even episodic aid do not prove the metaphysical essence you want them to prove. A Marxist asks what line was governing policy, what the principal contradiction was believed to be, and how that line misfired. You skip all that and go straight from historical error to timeless essence.
This is one of your stronger criticisms. China did maintain relations with Pinochet’s Chile. That was politically ugly and should be criticized. I am not interested in denying it.
But again you insist on making the criticism do more than it can. There is a difference between maintaining diplomatic relations with a reactionary state and proving strategic identity with that state’s class character. The principle that trade must not be confused with participation in war or with rendering assistance was articulated by Mao not as a temporary excuse for poor countries, but as a general point, citing Soviet trade with Germany and Italy during the Spanish war while the USSR materially assisted Republican Spain. Your attempt to say this principle “no longer applies” because China is richer simply shows that you have not understood the argument. Trade is not aid. If it were aid, it would be called aid.
Here your evidentiary standard drops sharply. The continued diplomatic relationship is easy to support. The stronger claim that China personally handed Pinochet millions of dollars is much thinner than you present it. You are taking a defensible criticism and attaching a much weaker allegation to intensify it. That is a pattern throughout your argument.
They should not be ignored. They should be ranked correctly. The dissolution of the USSR was driven above all by internal contradictions: ideological collapse, bureaucratic stagnation, national tensions, weakening party authority, and a reform line that unraveled into surrender under Gorbachev and then counterrevolution under Yeltsin. China did not produce Gorbachev. China did not produce Yeltsin. China did not hollow out the CPSU from within. Your argument vastly overstates China’s causal role because you are still reading Soviet decline through the lens of anti-China nostalgia instead of material ranking of causes.
Yes, the late anti-Soviet turn produced real intelligence cooperation with the United States and serious opportunist alignments. Yes, that should be criticized. But again, what does it prove? It proves a serious deviation in a specific period. It does not prove that every earlier Chinese criticism of Moscow’s hegemonic behavior was insincere or invented. You keep divorcing the late anti-Soviet line from the material conflict that produced it, above all the attempt by Moscow to subordinate Beijing strategically and ideologically within the socialist camp. Once you remove that material context, all that remains is moral storytelling. That is not historical materialism.
This criticism is fair as far as it goes. China’s official diplomatic line is a two-state solution. From the standpoint of full anti-colonial justice, that is limited and reformist. I have no problem saying so.
But here too you immediately overreach. As materialists, we do not ask which slogan sounds most pure in the abstract. We ask what forces are materially sustaining the occupation and what forces are materially constraining imperialism in the region. So long as Washington and the major EU powers retain the ability to arm, finance, and diplomatically shield Israel, calls for the immediate dissolution of Israel by a single outside state are not a serious political program. They are posture. Posture that is overwritten by the major support China provides to the axis of resistance.
This is simply not a serious ranking of the material facts. The EU itself states that it was Israel’s biggest trading partner in 2024, accounting for 32% of Israel’s total goods. China was Israel’s third-largest trading partner in 2024 (even without taking the EU as a bloc it still falls short of Ireland), after the EU and the United States. More importantly, the military backbone of Israeli power is American. Brown’s Costs of War project estimates at least $21.7 billion in US military aid to Israel in the two years after October 7, 2023, excluding additional committed arms deals, and notes that Israel’s combat aircraft, helicopters, bombs, missiles, and major targeting systems are mainly American. So no, Israel’s wealth and war-making power are not primarily “from China.” They are underwritten above all by Washington and Brussels. If you are going to talk like a materialist, rank the material supports correctly.