I actually had that thought as I was posting this. I was mocking people who are arrogant about their beliefs and refuse to be proven wrong, but I was also thinking about this paradox that every person believes each of their opinions to be correct yet also knows they can’t all be correct
Doesn’t this problem dissolve if you see yourself as holding a nonbinary personal level of confidence based on your own experiences and information? Of course people with different experiences are going to hold different beliefs, I haven’t seen what they’ve seen and vice versa. If both of us knew the whole truth we would agree, but we don’t so we disagree.
The bigger problem in practice, IMO, is that confidence is entangled with social-political weight. Someone who qualifies their statements gets taken less seriously than someone who doesn’t. People want others to confidently endorse positions to signal their friendship or alliance. Even microexpressions of doubt and the timing of actually taking things under consideration are seen as reasons to discredit one’s position, so we can’t even hold private doubts reliably.
So we are constantly being trained to feel and think that we are more confident than we really are, and realizing that can feel like the ground falling away beneath our feet because, social-politically, it is. But that’s a cultural issue rather than an epistemological one.
Doesn’t this problem dissolve if you see yourself as holding a nonbinary personal level of confidence based on your own experiences and information?
I don’t think so, and I think you pointed to why it doesn’t work in your comment:
Of course people with different experiences are going to hold different beliefs, I haven’t seen what they’ve seen and vice versa. If both of us knew the whole truth we would agree, but we don’t so we disagree.
Of course having weighted beliefs does help weaken the problem, and can go a long way, but it doesn’t remove it entirely
The weights you put on your beliefs are still beliefs. You can have belief (A) I think X is true, and belief (B) I believe that my belief A is 75% likely to be true.
But when you get down to it, B is just a belief, just like A is (the only difference is that A is a belief about another belief; but this doesn’t make it any less of a belief). So the weight you put on your beliefs are just yet more beliefs that you by definition believe be true.
Like all beliefs, these beliefs are not guaranteed to be true, even though we by definition believe them to be true. In fact this class of belief is fairly unreliable. Like you said, these beliefs are very subjective, because they are based on the experiences you’ve just happened to have in your life. But circumstances of chance like this are not a reliable way to form beliefs. So though you by definition belief all these meta-beliefs to all be true, they are almost certainly not all true.
So we are back where we are started: everyone believes all their beliefs to be true, but not everyone can be right all time.
Sorry, I know that explanation was a bit convoluted, but I don’t know how to explain it in depth without being convoluted. Does that make sense?
Why on god’s green earth would you believe meta-beliefs to be true “by definition”? Historically there have been so many changes to meta-beliefs, from divine inspiration to bayes’ law. I have memories of my meta-beliefs changing as a child, and honestly my meta-beliefs even change depending on my mood. So why the heck would I not expect the same to be possible in the future?
As far as I can tell, subjective belief probabilities are a sort of integration over forward propagation through lines of reasoning, world models, and meta-beliefs that occur in one’s brain.
This belief finds practical application in stuff like me making sure I eat if my meta-reasoning is cranky (assigning too little value to new information, expecting hostility to be more productive than empathy, etc.).
Though of course I am not super confident in any precise meta-meta-statements because human brains aren’t well understood yet by anyone, let alone me.
I suppose you could reduce all that complexity to a single line of reasoning that you try to trust with utmost confidence, but then I would expect you to get akrasia as the rest of your brain sees all the things you are missing and starts ignoring your “certain meta-beliefs”.
Ah, no wonder you’re having a epistemological crisis then. It must be hard only being able to do binary (true/false) logic when thinking about your own reasoning. I’m sorry you’re going through that.
I understand that intellectually you may have given the possibility that I’m at least partially right about reasoning zero credence. But, like, come oooon. You must remember times in your own life when you learned new ways of reasoning and changed your confidence in your beliefs as a result. So how surprised would you really be if you learned something new about how to reason? Can you really tell yourself you never expect that to happen again? Doesn’t it feel more like when you’re reading a book and you can’t predict what the next page is going to read?
Weighing your beliefs doesn’t guarantee that you’ll never have false beliefs, and you’ll still on some level believe all your beliefs to be true. That doesn’t mean weighing your beliefs is totally worthless and you are still free to do that if you like
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I actually had that thought as I was posting this. I was mocking people who are arrogant about their beliefs and refuse to be proven wrong, but I was also thinking about this paradox that every person believes each of their opinions to be correct yet also knows they can’t all be correct
Isn’t the solution to that problem really simple though? Just value doubt.
That definitely helps but doesn’t remove the problem entirely
Doesn’t this problem dissolve if you see yourself as holding a nonbinary personal level of confidence based on your own experiences and information? Of course people with different experiences are going to hold different beliefs, I haven’t seen what they’ve seen and vice versa. If both of us knew the whole truth we would agree, but we don’t so we disagree.
The bigger problem in practice, IMO, is that confidence is entangled with social-political weight. Someone who qualifies their statements gets taken less seriously than someone who doesn’t. People want others to confidently endorse positions to signal their friendship or alliance. Even microexpressions of doubt and the timing of actually taking things under consideration are seen as reasons to discredit one’s position, so we can’t even hold private doubts reliably.
So we are constantly being trained to feel and think that we are more confident than we really are, and realizing that can feel like the ground falling away beneath our feet because, social-politically, it is. But that’s a cultural issue rather than an epistemological one.
I don’t think so, and I think you pointed to why it doesn’t work in your comment:
Of course having weighted beliefs does help weaken the problem, and can go a long way, but it doesn’t remove it entirely
Could you explain why you think what I said means it doesn’t work?
The weights you put on your beliefs are still beliefs. You can have belief (A) I think X is true, and belief (B) I believe that my belief A is 75% likely to be true.
But when you get down to it, B is just a belief, just like A is (the only difference is that A is a belief about another belief; but this doesn’t make it any less of a belief). So the weight you put on your beliefs are just yet more beliefs that you by definition believe be true.
Like all beliefs, these beliefs are not guaranteed to be true, even though we by definition believe them to be true. In fact this class of belief is fairly unreliable. Like you said, these beliefs are very subjective, because they are based on the experiences you’ve just happened to have in your life. But circumstances of chance like this are not a reliable way to form beliefs. So though you by definition belief all these meta-beliefs to all be true, they are almost certainly not all true.
So we are back where we are started: everyone believes all their beliefs to be true, but not everyone can be right all time.
Sorry, I know that explanation was a bit convoluted, but I don’t know how to explain it in depth without being convoluted. Does that make sense?
Why on god’s green earth would you believe meta-beliefs to be true “by definition”? Historically there have been so many changes to meta-beliefs, from divine inspiration to bayes’ law. I have memories of my meta-beliefs changing as a child, and honestly my meta-beliefs even change depending on my mood. So why the heck would I not expect the same to be possible in the future?
As far as I can tell, subjective belief probabilities are a sort of integration over forward propagation through lines of reasoning, world models, and meta-beliefs that occur in one’s brain.
This belief finds practical application in stuff like me making sure I eat if my meta-reasoning is cranky (assigning too little value to new information, expecting hostility to be more productive than empathy, etc.).
Though of course I am not super confident in any precise meta-meta-statements because human brains aren’t well understood yet by anyone, let alone me.
I suppose you could reduce all that complexity to a single line of reasoning that you try to trust with utmost confidence, but then I would expect you to get akrasia as the rest of your brain sees all the things you are missing and starts ignoring your “certain meta-beliefs”.
A belief is a proposition that you think is true. If you think some proposition, meta or otherwise, is not true then it wouldn’t be a belief of yours
Ah, no wonder you’re having a epistemological crisis then. It must be hard only being able to do binary (true/false) logic when thinking about your own reasoning. I’m sorry you’re going through that.
I understand that intellectually you may have given the possibility that I’m at least partially right about reasoning zero credence. But, like, come oooon. You must remember times in your own life when you learned new ways of reasoning and changed your confidence in your beliefs as a result. So how surprised would you really be if you learned something new about how to reason? Can you really tell yourself you never expect that to happen again? Doesn’t it feel more like when you’re reading a book and you can’t predict what the next page is going to read?
Weighing your beliefs doesn’t guarantee that you’ll never have false beliefs, and you’ll still on some level believe all your beliefs to be true. That doesn’t mean weighing your beliefs is totally worthless and you are still free to do that if you like
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