The delivery of these missiles, or perhaps even the threat of the widespread deployment of these missiles represents a hard limit for russia in the groundwar in Ukraine as russia has been almost completely relying on fighter-bomber launched glide bombs for artillery pressure at the front. Ukraine has gotten too good at destroying russian artillery and the attrition has been too systematic, russia has no other options once Ukraine starts regularly knocking out russian fighter-bombers with long range missiles like this.

If russia chooses to attempt to continue to pursue the groundwar after Ukraine has these, they are fools as they will be unable to replace their jets and more importantly their institutional expertise after their crews all get shredded by Ukrainian air defenses.

Russia can continue to launch ballistic missiles and flying bomb/shahed attacks after Ukraine gets these missiles, but the ground war is effectively over for russia at least in terms of Ukraine being on the defense…

Furthermore, despite the inherent stand-off ranges afforded by glide bombs, the Su-34s and Su-35s can, and have, been targeted by long-range air defence systems and fighter aircraft. Tactics on both sides have evolved quickly, as have operator proficiency levels, creating a hazardous environment for fighters delivering glide bombs and for those attempting to intercept the bomb droppers.29

Ukraine is actively exploiting such vulnerabilities and evolving tactics to mitigate the glide bomb threat. Electronic warfare has emerged as the most effective countermeasure to glide bomb employment. The Pokrova system and other specialised jammers have reportedly been effective in degrading UMPK accuracy, while the widespread Ukrainian use of dispersion and concealment has complicated Russian efforts to obtain timely and accurate target coordinates. These factors appear to be steadily reducing the effectiveness of Russian glide bomb employment, leading some Russian military bloggers to lament the effectiveness of Ukrainian countermeasures.30

…

The most decisive way to defeat glide bombs is to destroy the launch platform before weapon release. ‘Killing the archers’ remains a foundational approach, but it requires robust capabilities for Suppression/Destruction of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD/DEAD) to allow friendly air power to operate in hostile territory and target launch platforms.33 Achieving this requires continued investment in long-range air-to-air missiles, advanced fighter aircraft, and deep strike assets capable of holding adversary aircraft and airfields at risk.34

https://www.japcc.org/articles/countering-russias-glide-bomb-warfare-in-ukraine/

Ukraine is destroying record amounts of Russian artillery by deploying increasingly effective systems to locate and target big guns. In the last few weeks the action has shifted up a gear, with Ukraine claiming a staggering 122 artillery pieces on 28th March, the highest daily total ever.

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Artillery now [April 1st, 2025] plays a much decreased role; the Russians now rely more on glide bombs for tactical firepower at the front line. While there may be several reasons for the decline in artillery – loss of the scout drones to find targets and adjust fire, a reduction in the number of shells available – the destruction of guns on the front line looks like a significant factor. Is Russian artillery in danger of extinction?

https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidhambling/2025/04/01/ukraine-destroys-record-122-russian-artillery-pieces-in-one-day/

^ May 2026 Update -> It did, russian artillery is now extinct as a strategic force (though it is still tactically present in large numbers) hence why russia is relying on glide bombs… which are about to be a thing russia cannot rely on.

I emphasize these points both because the overall story of how the war has shifted in Ukraine’s favor is not a mystery at a macro level when you look at the industrial inputs and basic strategy Ukraine has been pursuing and because the pivotal meaning of this news needs to be underlined because of what it means about the trajectory of the Ukraine War.

Edit A crucial part of the story was also Ukraine’s effective use of Counter Battery Radar to a degree of proficiency that russia could not match. Drones in conjunction with these radars and on their own as loitering munitions hunting down artillery in the backline obviously played a massive role, that cannot be understated. However it also must be noted that Ukraine crucially mastered the Electronic Warfare component of Counter Battery Warfare that is the step before a strike response whether it is a traditional one in with friendly artillery cannons firing on the suspected enemy artillery piece’s location or it is some form of drone attack (or HIMARS type rockets which are another brutally effective Counter Battery Weapon). Ukraine is crucially now developing a domestic equivalent of the US Counter Battery Radar system. Again not every drone kill of artillery is a product of these Counter Battery Radars but at a systematic level the Counter Battery Radars turn the tide against enemy artillery by so frequently and reliably giving their positions to friendly strike assets. These radars played a decisive role in forcing russia to change their doctrine with how they deploy artillery and pull it much further back, limiting its use especially in offensive contexts.

https://united24media.com/latest-news/ukraine-developing-domestic-counter-battery-radar-modeled-on-us-antpq-36-14614

TL;DR this is the final manifestation of the process that the Bohdana began.