…Yet it seems safe to say that the world no longer trusts U.S. promises, and perhaps no longer fears U.S. threats, the way it used to. The problem, however, isn’t Biden; it’s the party that reflexively attacks him for anything that goes wrong.
Right now America is a superpower without a fully functioning government. Specifically, the House of Representatives has no speaker, so it can’t pass legislation, including bills funding the government and providing aid to U.S. allies. The House is paralyzed because Republican extremists, who have refused to acknowledge Biden’s legitimacy and promoted chaos rather than participating in governance, have turned these tactics on their own party. At this point it’s hard to see how anyone can become speaker without Democratic votes — but even less extreme Republicans refuse to reach across the aisle.
And even if Republicans do somehow manage to elect a speaker, it seems all too likely that whoever gets the job will have to promise the hard right that he will betray Ukraine.
Given this political reality, how much can any nation trust U.S. assurances of support? How can we expect foreign enemies of democracy to fear America when they know that there are powerful forces here that share their disdain?
In what way does addition to a third sum dilute the first two sums?
If Candidate A has one vote, Candidate B has one vote, and Candidate C has one vote, does adding one to Candidate C’s sum somehow detract from Candidate A’s sum?
Does it somehow give Candidate A an advantage over Candidate B, who still have equal and unchanged sums?
Of course not. That would violate basic math.
It’s interesting, however, that you highlight a basic need for divided opponents as the con to a third party… yet it applies better to the current duopolistic nature where either party is increasingly dependent on nothing more than the polarized and divided voterbase. Look no further than continued blue no matter who etc. and ongoing painting of entire parties in a given light to the neglect of the actual candidates.
FPTP places no such requirement on voters - the only presence of such is your absurd insistence such a requirement exists.
Do you see this requirement in place in some form of legislation you must adhere to? No?
Ironically, if a voter signaled their actual preferences - to the disregard of blue no matter who and similar nonsense - it’s likely third parties would be faring far better. Unfortunately, you and others here seem to be dead-set on vote shaming outside the duopoly.
Oh? Canvassing has ceased to exist? The results of other elections - especially those in primaries where the primary differences are policy choices and messaging (to those policies) - can’t serve as any form of indicator?
Interesting.
You once-more describe the current state of things while attempting to describe some other state of things.
The only harm here is your insistence a voter should vote how you believe they should vote to the neglect of their actual preferences - a thing that actually damages democracy.
It’s not addition, it’s division . If you divide a finite pool of votes among more candidates, the effect is that candidates similar to each other will draw from the same pool of voters, while not drawing votes from the candidate most-ideologically opposed to them. Imagine, if you will, the scenario with a green and blue candidates B and C, where a third (let’s call him “A”, and place him close to the greens) gets in to the race.
A is third-party, center-green
B is green
C is blue
In this scenario, there are two candidates dividing the pool of green/center-voters between them. A and B probably aren’t appealing to any of C’s supporters. Let’s say that A and B got 25% and 35% respectively, you’ve got a green-blue split of 60-40 that awards the blue candidate victory because it got the remaining 40% and A and B split a green-majority’s votes enough to lose. A entering this race divided (or diluted) the greens’ available votes.
Because splitting up a majority of votes can hand victory to an undivided minority party, there is very much an incentive for voters that don’t want their side to lose to coordinate voting to vote on the one that “can win”. This involves betting on how other voters will vote, in order to avoid splitting their majority. That in turn transforms voting from an exercise in selecting your preference into an exercise in voting where you think other voters on your side of the spectrum will vote.
A ranked-choice voting system (which allows the voter to signal their choices in ranked order) does not require them to vote in the way they imagine most of their ideological allies will vote- it allows them to send their preferences as discrete signals instead.
If you don’t understand this, you don’t understand it, and you would do well not to finger-wag about basic math