- cross-posted to:
- news@hexbear.net
- cross-posted to:
- news@hexbear.net
cross-posted from: https://hexbear.net/post/5696151
On 9 July, Austrian parliamentarians passed a highly controversial bill legalising the deployment of state-sponsored spyware, known as the Federal Trojan (Bundestrojaner), to enable the interception of encrypted communications.
The Bundestrojaner bill would give law enforcement agencies the power to install malware on private devices (such as smartphones or laptops) to monitor encrypted messaging applications.
It would do so by amending several laws, including: the State Security and Intelligence Service Act; the Security Police Act; the Telecommunications Act;the Federal Administrative Court Act; and the Judges’ and Public Prosecutors’ Service Act.
The plan sparked widespread concern among privacy advocates, cybersecurity experts, and numerous civil society organisations.
The day before the vote more than 50 organisations, including Statewatch, wrote to legislators.
A joint letter (pdf) called on them to “vote against this dangerous instrument of state surveillance and against a historic step backwards for IT security in the information society.”
Legislators in Austria’s lower parliamentary house, the National Council, voted in favour of the bill, 105 to 71.
The interior minister Gerhard Karner, described it as a “special day for security.” Support for the bill came from the governing parties – the conservative Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP), the Social Democratic Party (SPÖ), and most members of the liberal NEOS party.
Two NEOS MPs, Stephanie Krisper and Nikolaus Scherak, broke ranks to vote against the measure, alongside the Greens and the far-right Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ).
On 17 July, the Federal Council – the upper house of the legislature – voted by 40 to 19 not to object to the bill, completing the parliamentary process.
The bill now awaits unanimous approval from the governments of Austria’s nine states before it can become, a constitutional requirement triggered by the inclusion of certain provisions on the administrative judiciary.
Nevertheless, opposition parties and civil society organisations have said they will file legal challenges against the measures.
Government officials insist that the spyware will be restricted to targeting messaging apps and that broader system-wide searches will not be permitted.
However, technical experts have repeatedly warned that such limitations are practically unenforceable in real-world applications.
Spyware with the capability to intercept encrypted communications inevitably provides access to a wide array of personal information stored on the device, including photos, files, emails, contacts, and location data.
Critics note that this effectively bypasses all existing security protections, raising serious questions about the proportionality, necessity, and legality of such intrusive surveillance powers.
The current legislation includes some procedural safeguards, in an attempt to respond to critiques of previous state trojan proposals.
These include an extension of the review period for the Legal Protection Commissioner (from two weeks to three months), and transferring the authority to approve spyware deployment from a single judge to a panel of judges at the Federal Administrative Court.
However, the Legal Protection Commissioner is part of the Ministry of the Interior – the very same ministry that authorises and deploys the spyware – raising significant concerns about impartiality and conflicts of interest.
Furthermore, the intelligence agencies themselves conduct the mandatory trustworthiness assessments for the Commissioner and their deputies, further undermining the potential for effective and independent scrutiny of surveillance activities.
The bill was approved in the National Council despite extensive opposition from a broad range of civil society groups, professional bodies, and public institutions – including bar associations, universities, municipalities, press freedom advocates, and medical organisations.
Following the vote, civil society organisations describing the law as institutionalising state hacking by deliberately exploiting software vulnerabilities.
In a joint statement, they said that the government should be working to close these gaps to protect citizens from cyber threats.
The Bundestrojaner has a long and contentious legislative history in Austria. Initial attempts to introduce similar surveillance powers date back to 2016, but they were repeatedly rejected or delayed due to sustained criticism and concerns about privacy violations.
In 2019, Austria’s constitutional court struck down an earlier version of the law, ruling that surveillance of encrypted communications constituted a serious breach of fundamental privacy rights protected under the constitution.
Austria, what the fuck? They’re even calling it a “Bundestrojaner” and nobody’s batting an eye?
They do seem to be batting an eye though.
Yeah there’s a reason why Austria buddied up with Germany very quickly after they went fasch.
This is the
worstsecond worst thing to come from AustriaThird worst thing, denuvo is the second
Dammit I’ll be the one. What’s the first?
That one failed artist
Failed artist from Austria? Which one?
EU member states been trying this for years and it doesn’t look like they will stop anytime soon.
Get your Linux and custom rom devices ready for the boogaloo
next measure: locking down bootloaders.
TBH it is already happening
OnePlus did it in 2022 and others are doing it top
almost like we have to organize to assert our rights.
layman won’t do it because then can’t quite see how this encroaches on our rights. its up to us.
Samsung was next
idk if custom rom would protect it if its a android app that does it maybe just ubuntu touch
GrapheneOS you can manage permissions better so you would have to go and let it get the access
In that case you can still use open source messaging apps that you could compile yourself if you don’t trust the distributor.
This doesn’t help with the type of exploits they’re talking about (eg; Pegasus). Those gain access to your device itself, thus giving access to all apps on your device.
Any idea how they are going to implement it?
Like, how can they force-install it on my device?
If you have Windows, they can absolutely coordinate with Microsoft for stealth installs. If you’re using Linux, it’ll be a little tougher, but not impossible. Your processor (and probably bios) have government backdoors built in.
Probably through undisclosed security flaws, which will totally not be used by criminals trust me bro.
Hey Anonymous, want to hack Austria? They’re asking for it.
Anonymous at this point is three feds in a trenchcoat, so they won’t.
And just like that Austrian citizens will be the target of every hacker group on the world as the state malware will be a weak link in every device’s security layers and once they crack it, they’ll have deep access to thousands or maybe even millions of people’s devices depending on ho w broadly police decide to deploy it (likely on every device of every person who is arrested, detained, or has any contact with police for any reason like perhaps just visiting prisoners or entering government buildings to renew a passport.)
deep access to thousands or maybe even millions of people’s devices depending on ho w broadly police decide to deploy it
Maybe read the article before you post?
I get it, germans have tried to get Bundestrojaner through again and again, only to have explained why it’s a bad idea. But still, it’s not about mass surveillance.
What a naive and foolish thing to say.
I’m going with how police work currently in the US as a baseline. In the US, many jurisdictions require that you surrender your phone as a blanket policy, and if you refuse to unlock it, many have software to hack it. This has been determined generally to be legal as simply being detained or entering restricted areas is considered probable cause for a search, just like a physical search of your person or purse or whatever is legal.
Assuming Austria does something similar and now they additionally can install illicit malware, I think they absolutely will as a blanket policy.
I’m going with how police work currently in the US as a baseline.
Bad idea.
Jfc
sounds like it’s not supposed to be a general use tool, but instead for counterintelligence only:
The Ministry of the Interior anticipates submitting around 30 requests per year for the surveillance of unencrypted messages and between 5 to 15 requests for encrypted communications. If there are 30 instances of encrypted message monitoring within a single calendar year, the Interior Minister is obligated to inform a permanent subcommittee of the National Council, which is the directly elected chamber of the Austrian Parliament.
Each surveillance method will require case-by-case approval from the Federal Administrative Court. The process involves a legal protection officer from the Ministry of the Interior, who will have three business days to respond to any request. Following that, a panel of three judges from the Federal Administrative Court will review the case. In urgent situations, an individual judge may grant approval, supported by a 24-hour judicial service system.
https://themunicheye.com/austrian-government-approves-malware-surveillance-23431
broad use would expose its existence and make any 0days useless in short order