Latin American and European leaders convened in the coastal Caribbean city of Santa Marta, Colombia this weekend to discuss trade, energy and security, yet regional polarization over the Trump administration’s lethal strikes on alleged drug boats in the Caribbean overshadowed the regional agenda and significantly depressed turnout. Last week, Bloomberg reported that EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, French President Emmanuel Macron and other European and Latin American leaders were skipping the IV EU-CELAC Summit, a biannual gathering of heads of state that represents nearly a third of the world’s countries and a quarter of global GDP, over tensions between Washington and the host government of Gustavo Petro. Officially, the leaders cited the “current European political agenda and the low participation of other heads of state and government.” Petro — who the Trump administration has placed on the Treasury Department’s Specially Designated Nationals list after calling him an “illegal drug leader” without providing any evidence — said last month that Washington was exerting pressure on countries, particularly in the Caribbean, to skip the event, in what he called a “diplomatic boycott.”

EU Council President Antonio Costa and EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Kaja Kallas attended the summit in place of von der Leyen — who had previously confirmed her attendance in a meeting with Petro in Brussels last month — while the president of Spain and the prime ministers of Portugal and the Netherlands were among the 9 total heads of state and government present. Despite a well-attended EU-CELAC Summit in Brussels in 2023 — in which von der Leyen said that the EU aspired to be “the partner of choice” for Latin America and the Caribbean — EU leaders’ more recent concerns about antagonizing the U.S. administration have seemingly outweighed their quest for strategic autonomy at a time when the bloc is seeking to deepen its relations beyond the U.S. At the last summit, the EU, which trades over $400 billion annually with the region and is by far its largest investor, relaunched a strategic partnership with 33 countries of CELAC, or the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, in part by announcing $45 billion in fresh financing through the Global Gateway Initiative. More broadly, the EU has presented itself as a like-minded, reliable partner for Latin America and the Caribbean amid shifting geopolitics and great power competition in the hemisphere, and sees the region as a potential market for its industrial products and a stable supplier of renewable energy and critical minerals. The region possesses 60% of the world’s lithium and 40% of its copper, holds 60% of global renewable energy potential, and represents 14% of global food production and 45% of the global agri-food trade.

Seeing immense potential for growth, the EU is currently finalizing two major trade agreements with Mexico and MERCOSUR (Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay and Bolivia), a key litmus test for further biregional integration. Yet Washington’s increasingly aggressive stance toward the Americas, including military threats against Venezuela and nearly two dozen airstrikes against alleged drug boats that Petro considers extrajudicial killings, has shifted the Europeans’ calculus, sources familiar with the matter told Bloomberg. In the leadup to this weekend’s summit, Brazilian president Luiz Inacio “Lula” da Silva, who attended alongside heads of state from Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, and St. Kitts and Nevis, said the meeting “would only make sense, at this moment, if it were to discuss the issue of U.S. warships in Latin American waters.” To discuss that issue, Lula went so far as to temporarily leave his own summit, the COP30 U.N. climate conference in Belém, Brazil, which both von der Leyen and Macron attended last week. Despite skipping out on Santa Marta, Macron — who apparently had few qualms appearing alongside Petro — traveled from Brazil to Mexico City this weekend to meet with Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum, who also did not attend the EU-CELAC Summit despite expressing criticism of the U.S. boat strikes. Colombian Vice Foreign Minister Mauricio Jaramillo Jassir said last week that upcoming presidential elections in Chile and Honduras also made it difficult for those countries’ center-left presidents Gabriel Boric and Xiomara Castro, who have attended past CELAC summits, to join their peers in Santa Marta. Bolivia, which for 20 years under the Movement for Socialism (MAS) party was heavily involved in regional fora, inaugurated a new, center-right president Saturday, Rodrigo Paz, who also did not attend.

Founded in 2011 in Caracas as a counterweight to the Washington-based Organization of American States (OAS), CELAC includes every country in the Western Hemisphere except the United States and Canada. The bloc has served as a vehicle to boost Latin American and Caribbean ties beyond the U.S., not only with the EU, but also with India, the African Union, the Arab world and China. In May, shortly after taking over from Honduran President Xiomara Castro as the body’s president pro tempore, Petro traveled to Beijing with Brazil’s Lula, Chilean President Gabriel Boric, and dozens of foreign ministers to preside over the Fourth Ministerial Meeting of the China-CELAC Forum alongside Chinese President Xi Jinping. Yet CELAC has been hobbled by the lack of a permanent secretariat, annual changes in the group’s leadership, piecemeal financing, non-binding decisions, and persistent internal divisions. At the CELAC heads of state summit in Honduras last March, which featured a rare appearance by Mexico’s Sheinbaum, internal tensions over how to respond to the Trump administration’s migration, trade and security agenda led Argentina, Paraguay and Nicaragua to object to the body’s final declaration.

The downgraded EU-CELAC summit in Santa Marta this weekend came just a week after the Dominican Republic announced that next month’s X Summit of the Americas, an arguably more significant regional meeting organized in close coordination with the U.S. State Department and the OAS, would be postponed due to the “unforeseeable, profound differences that make productive dialogues in the Americas difficult.” After the Dominican Republic decided last month that Cuba, Venezuela and Nicaragua would not be invited to attend the Summit — just as President Biden did for the 2022 summit in Los Angeles — Petro and Sheinbaum said they would not attend in opposition to the exclusion of any country. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and a number of Cuban-American Republican lawmakers immediately backed Santo Domingo’s announcement, which also cited the devastating impact of Hurricane Melissa in the Caribbean among its reasons for postponement. The two diplomatic let-downs mark one of the lowest moments for regional relations in decades.

Yet as the Trump administration makes its distaste for multilateralism abundantly clear, some countries in the region are taking the cue by prioritizing their bilateral ties to the U.S. over deeper integration with their neighbors. Last week, Ecuadorean President Daniel Noboa received Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem to explore potential U.S. bases in the country. Argentine President Javier Milei made his fourteenth trip to the U.S. in under two years to speak alongside President Trump at a Miami business summit. Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele allowed a U.S. attack aircraft to operate out of his capital’s international airport. And Trinidadian Prime Minister Kamla Persad-Bissessar let a U.S. warship dock at the country’s main port just seven miles off the Venezuelan coast. Needless to say, none of these presidents bothered to travel to Santa Marta, and their representatives abstained from many clauses in the final declaration.

As the European Union struggles to agree on a coherent response to Israel’s war on Gaza, Estonia’s and Latvia’s foreign ministers recently warmly welcomed their Israeli counterpart, Gideon Sa’ar. This diplomatic embrace, occurring as Israel stands accused before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and International Criminal Court (ICC) of crimes against humanity and plausible acts of genocide, reveals a profound and damaging hypocrisy. It is also a strategic blunder. Estonian Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna this week welcomed Sa’ar to open the Israeli Embassy in Tallinn. During the ceremony, Tsahkna and his Latvian counterpart Baiba Braze reaffirmed Israel’s “right to self-defense” and condemned “Iran’s destabilizing role.” This is the second visit by Israel’s foreign minister to the region in the last few months: Sa’ar’s first destination after the “12 day war” with Iran was to the Baltic trio of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, where his narrative of the conflict received a sympathetic hearing.

But the contradiction in these Baltic states’ posturing is staggering. Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia have built their entire post-Soviet foreign policy and identity on an uncompromising stance toward Russia. Their historical trauma from the Soviet occupation was only reinforced by the Russian invasion and ongoing war in Ukraine.

on no not the “historical trauma” (cw: ww2 atrocities)

Understandably, the Baltic states were at the vanguard of a resolute response to the 2022 Russian invasion — lobbying for international sanctions, shunning diplomacy with Moscow, and even advocating for measures implying a collective responsibility of Russian citizens for the crimes committed by the country’s leadership. For example, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Kaja Kallas, the former prime minister of Estonia, pushed for blanket visa restrictions on all Russians. While Baltic state officials cite security concerns as their justification, Russian dissidents criticized the measure as counterproductive and playing right into the hands of the Kremlin. Yet, when it comes to Israel, these same principles evaporated. A diplomatic red carpet is rolled out for the top diplomat of a state whose military campaign has killed more than 69,000 Palestinians, according to Gaza health authorities, displaced vast numbers of the inhabitants, and brought famine to the beleaguered enclave. The ICJ has ordered Israel to take measures to prevent acts of genocide and allow humanitarian aid. The ICC has indicted Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for war crimes — alongside Russian President Vladimir Putin. Israel has also violated U.S. President Trump’s ceasefire by killing hundreds of Palestinians and conducting more 124 bombardments after it supposedly entered into force (as of Nov. 11).

The rulings of the international courts and Israeli violations of the ceasefire should, at the very least, give any nation claiming to champion a “rules-based order” serious pause. Instead, the Baltics offer full normalization and support. This selective application of international norms does not go unnoticed. It is seen clearly in Madrid, Dublin, Ljubljana, Brussels, and even Paris, where leaders have publicly criticized Israel’s conduct. The governments of Spain and Ireland, in particular, have been vocal in demanding that the EU hold Israel accountable, framing it as a fundamental test of the bloc’s values. When Baltic diplomats then lecture these same partners on the existential need for unwavering solidarity with Ukraine, their words increasingly ring hollow. How can they demand absolute, value-driven support for one victim of aggression while actively legitimizing a government accused of gross violations in another?

This hypocrisy is not just a moral failure; it is also a profound strategic miscalculation. While it’s true that some EU countries, like Hungary, the Czech Republic and Austria, are even more explicitly pro-Israel, none of them is as vulnerable as the Baltics. As small countries at Russia’s doorstep, Baltic security depends almost entirely on EU-NATO cohesion. With doubts growing about Washington’s long-term commitment to European security, the reliance on European solidarity is more vital than ever. Alienating key EU member states by dismissing their views on Gaza is therefore strategically myopic. It provides ammunition to those in Western Europe who are growing increasingly frustrated by what they see as unhelpful sanctimony expressed by figures like Kallas and other Baltic leaders. The Baltics should actively avoid creating an impression that they champion a “rules-based order” only when it suits their immediate geopolitical interests — and yet they appear to be doing exactly the opposite.

This strategic error is compounded by a fatal misreading of Israel’s own calculus. The Baltics are courting a country whose interests are vested infinitely more in its relationship with Russia than in them. Indeed, Israel’s primary concern is not to help Ukraine, but to deter Iran. That includes preventing Tehran from rearming and, notably, rebuilding its air defenses after the June war with Israel. Russia has capabilities it can offer to Iran to bolster its defenses. In fact, its deputy foreign minister, Sergey Ryabkov, said that since Moscow does not recognize the snapback of the U.N. Security Council sanctions against Iran, triggered by the European powers, it is looking forward to expanding its military-technical cooperation with Tehran. While the true extent of such cooperation remains to be seen, the mere possibility is a source of deep anxiety to Israel. Therefore, Jerusalem has consistently — and remarkably successfully — sought pragmatic, cordial relations with Moscow in order to minimize the latter’s support for Tehran. The dynamic is extensively described in former Mossad chief Yossi Cohen’s memoir, in which he glowingly describes Putin as a strategic mastermind open to understanding Israel’s concerns. For Israel, limiting Russia’s support for Iran will always be immensely more consequential than whatever marginal gains it could accrue from cultivating the Baltic states. It is a failure of Baltic diplomacy not to recognize this obvious hierarchy of interests. Tallinn and Riga are investing diplomatic capital in an actor whose own strategic necessities align it with their primary adversary — all while risking alienating partners in the EU and NATO and undermining their own moral high ground.

To be a credible champion for Ukraine, one must be a consistent champion for international law. There is no other way. If the Baltics continue down this path of selective morality and legality, they risk fracturing the very unity that constitutes their first and most important line of defense. The embrace of Israel today could pave the way for a much colder reception in the councils of Europe tomorrow — precisely when they can least afford it. This won’t happen overnight, as credibility can erode over time, especially when it is being needlessly undermined. International law is not a menu; you cannot stand for the main course in Ukraine while treating Gaza as a dispensable side dish. And much less so when the strategic benefits of doing so are highly dubious.

Now that the US government is open after the longest shutdown in history, the Pentagon is playing catchup, announcing nearly $9 billion in scores of contract awards on Thursday, including a potential big-ticket win for Boeing’s Chinook line with funds aligned to move out with a deal for German aircraft. After a 43-day shutdown, President Donald Trump inked a continuing resolution Wednesday night to reopen the government until Jan. 30, while some departments or agencies received funding through the end of fiscal year 2026 (military construction and Department Veterans Affairs, the Department of Agriculture and Food and Drug Administration, and the legislative branch). With the Pentagon’s furloughed civilian workforce back at their desks Thursday, the department released details of more than 80 deals it reached over the nearly six-week stint that rough math shows came in under the $9 billion mark in total. (That’s a rough estimate as the figure represents amounts like the ceiling of some indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity contracts or new modifications to existing contracts.)

The agreements ranged from smaller ticket follow-on deals to larger ones like one worth up to $876 million for 60 CH-47F Block II helicopters for Germany. Under that Chinook deal, according to the announcement, the company has until late 2035 to deliver aircraft. During the government shutdown, the Army also tapped AeroVironment to produce several aerial drones for international customers — the Puma All Environment 3, the Puma Long Endurance, the Puma All Environment and Long Endurance Hybrid, and the Raven. While that deal holds a “cumulative face value” of $874 million, the service has not yet shelled out any of those funds, according to the announcement. Over in the Air Force, the service awarded Anduril Industries with up to $50 million for a Small Business Innovation Research for its Agile-Launched, tactically-integrated unmanned system. “This contract provides for procurement and support of the ALTIUS-600 system and related Group 2 UAS variants, payloads, data links, launch tubes … to support the government’s efforts to fully integrate the ALTIUS-600 onto various platforms, as well as integrating new accessories onto the ALTIUS-600,” the announcement said.

Blue Origin also received a $78 million “contract for expansion” for space vehicle processing at Cape Canaveral Space Force Station, Fla. with work to be completed by the end of January 2028.

The US State Department today gave the greenlight for a massive $3.2 billion missile deal with Germany. The deal could see RTX sell Berlin 173 Standard Missile 6 (SM-6) Block 1 missiles, 577 Standard Missile 2 (SM-2) Block III missiles as well as associated launchers, related equipment and US contractor logistical support. “The proposed sale will improve Germany’s capability to meet current and future threats by providing integrated air and missile defense capabilities deployable from their future Aegis Weapon System equipped F127 class surface combatants, bolstering Germany’s capacity to present a credible deterrence to regional strategic competitors,” a notice posted on the Defense Security Cooperation Agency’s website says. “The proposed sale will also improve Germany’s ability to operate alongside U.S. and Allied naval forces in facing a full spectrum of maritime threats. Germany will have no difficulty absorbing these missiles into its armed forces.”

Last year, the German government gave the official greenlight to the F127 frigate program, which German shipbuilder TKMS said was the “next generation of sea-based air defense.” RTX describes the SM-6 as “three missiles in one,” capable of conduting anti-air and anti-surface warfare, as well as ballistic missile defense. SM-2, meanwhile, is a dedicated surface-to-air defense missile, which RTX says can defend “against anti-ship missiles and aircraft out to 90 nautical miles (103 miles) and an altitude of 65,000 feet. As with all foreign military sales, dollar figures and unit amounts are subject to change as negotiations continue. Lawmakers will also have the opportunity to step in to prevent the sale, though that’s unlikely as Germany is seen as a key defense partner in Europe.

The German economy is in recession. Manufacturing has imploded, particularly in the crucial automotive sector, which has shed hundreds of thousands of jobs since 2022, and lost a staggering third of its production volume since 2018. August saw the biggest drop in industrial output in more than three years, over four times the decline analysts expected. The crucial machinery sector has dropped 22% since the pre-covid period, with a 5.6% drop expected this year alone. In recent months, massive declines have occurred in the pharmaceutical, electronic, energy, construction, and hospitality industries. A brutal combination of energy price increases, increased regulation, tariffs, competition from China, and government policy have crushed Germany, which underpins the European economy. The supply chains for its manufacturing sector typically stretch across the entire EU, and the controlled demolition of its productive output is having ripple effects across the continent.

The German solution to this is debt – lots of debt. German borrowing has been extraordinarily reserved for a Western state ever since the “debt brake” amendment passed by the first Merkel cabinet came into effect in 2016, limiting deficit spending to 0.35% of GDP. In 2022, then Chancellor Olaf Scholz successfully led an amendment to the rule that allowed the creation of a €100 billion defense fund immune from the brake. In spring of this year, Scholz and incoming Chancellor Friedrich Merz agreed to another amendment to exempt defense spending over 1% of GDP. Over challenges from the AfD, FDP, and Die Linke, the amendment was passed in late March. In both cases, the war in Ukraine was the explicit rationale for subverting Germany’s debt limits. With deficit defense spending now unrestrained by its constitution, the German government announced earlier this year that it plans to double its current levels of defense spending over the next five years. $761 billion will be spent by the end of 2029. More than half – $469 billion – of this total will be funded through new debt. Net German government borrowing already more than doubled this year, increasing from $38 billion in 2024 to at least $95 billion by the end of 2025. Included in the 5 year spending plan is at least $10 billion in direct aid to Ukraine.

While it may seem imprudent for the German government to attempt to revamp the Bundeswehr and simultaneously fund a proxy war in the midst of a historic economic decline, there is a certain logic at play. In this piece, we’ll explore how EU economies benefit from the continuance of the war in Ukraine, and how they use the war to offset the effects of deindustrialization. EU defense spending since the war began has surged by over 50%, increasing by nearly $150 billion a year from 2021-2025. The only EU state which hasn’t seen double-digit growth in defense expenditures since 2021 is Greece, which modestly decreased its spending. These figures do not include the $70 billion in military “aid” to Ukraine given during this period, some of which is considered an investment instead of an expenditure, because it often comes in the form of loans. Ukraine currently owes $117 billion in debt to external creditors, with $50 billion of this figure being to EU institutions, and the remainder being to international lenders through which the EU has significant exposure, like the IMF and World Bank. In total, the EU has provided just under $200 billion in assistance to Ukraine, and another $170 billion in assistance to Ukrainian refugees residing within the EU.

Taken in cumulative terms since the beginning of the war, and projected forward in line with planned spending and debt increases across the EU, the war in Ukraine is the justification for an enormous injection of borrowed cash into the European economy roughly at the same scale of the $700 billion emergency bank bailout during the 2008 US financial crisis. Unlike the 2008 bailout, however, this project has gone largely unremarked upon – being laundered through messaging around “peace through strength” or the “defense of democracy,” rather than being taken as an emergency measure to stave off economic decline. While these numbers may sound astronomical, the EU is just getting started. In June, NATO collectively agreed to meet Trump’s requested target of 5% of GDP on defense spending. All NATO member states are on track to hit the initial 2% target by the end of this year, meaning spending will more than double by 2035. Spending specifically for Ukraine will count towards the target.

Out With the Old

Nowhere is the substitution of defense spending for typical economic activity more obvious than in Germany. As the share price of automakers like Porche (-41% since IPO), Mercedes (-21%) and Volkswagen (-51%) have been stagnant or declined dramatically since the war began, the German defense industry has surged. Rheinmetall, Germany’s second largest defense contractor, has seen its stock grow 2522% in value since 2020, and Airbus, Germany’s largest, has jumped 224%. The STOXX index, which tracks Europe’s total aerospace and defense market, has posted gains of 229% since February 2022. This has resulted in an interesting phenomenon – German automotive factories being converted to defense sector production.

“So we think it’s very important for the German industry and for us to find new markets. And where are new markets? Well, government has committed a lot of new funding for defense. We are quite close to what defense industry needs, so it’s very obvious for us to look to this market.” Marin Buchs, JOPP group (NPR)

Automotive suppliers across Germany have avoided closure by switching to the production of military drones, engines for armored vehicles, and artillery barrels. Rheinmetall, which itself makes automotive components for the civilian market, has begun to convert two of its plants to defense products, and plans to purchase a VW plant that once employed 2,300 people but shut down in 2024. Rheinmetall’s automotive division has seen consistent declines in revenue while its defense divisions post triple digit operating profit increases. German/French defense group KNDS announced a similar plan to retool an east German plant which once made train locomotives to instead manufacture Puma and Leopard 2 armored vehicles. KNDS is planning an IPO, while Thyssenkrupp prepares to spin off its naval defense subsidiary TKMS. The plans of European defense contractors universally hinge on guarantees for purchase minimums from their respective governments. Rheinmetall requested a contract for at least 1,000 armored vehicles in order to move ahead with their proposal to purchase the defunct VW factory. While building out the Bundeswehr will require vast quantities of new vehicles, there’s no better justification for large contracts than the war in Ukraine. The conflict has vacuumed up tens of thousands of infantry fighting vehicles, MRAPs, armored cars, and tanks, and because much of this material is destined to be destroyed, there will always be a need for more. Rheinmetall’s order backlog at the beginning of the year stood at $65 billion – six full years of sales at current levels.

The success of the defense industry amidst the decline of the automotive industry is the result of a simple asymmetry. While automakers compete in a relatively open market, defense contractors do not. Concerns like the costs of energy and labor create insurmountable obstacles to manufacturing within Europe, because consumers have the ability to select cheaper options from manufacturers in places like China. With real earnings for the German population still below pre-2022 levels, access to cheap overseas goods is essential to prevent a precipitous decline in quality of life. The defense industry does not need to play by these rules. Arms deals don’t adhere to free trade principles, and are often negotiated through a combination of political pressure, bribery, and government subsidies. Input costs, like energy, are largely irrelevant, and purchase price is not a significant concern. Nowhere is this more true than in Ukraine, where any notion of free market competition is nonsensical. To understand this, we’ll analyze how procurement contracts between the AFU and the European defense sector work in practical terms.

Government accountability advocates and some lawmakers have long argued that defense contractors have overcharged the military. But Driscoll’s comments were unusually blunt for a sitting government official speaking out against companies that supply the largest military in the world. “(The) defense industrial base broadly, and the primes in particular, conned the American people and the Pentagon and the Army,” Driscoll told reporters, referring to prime contractors that work directly with the government. He added that, in part, it was the government’s fault for creating incentive structures that encouraged companies to charge astronomical prices.

Large weapons makers provide the U.S. military with all types of systems, from Lockheed Martin’s F-35 fighter jets to missile defense systems from companies like RTX, Northrop Grumman and Boeing. Previously, the Army has said that a Lockheed-owned Sikorsky Black Hawk helicopter screen control knob that costs $47,000 as part of a full assembly could be manufactured independently for just $15. “The system has changed. You will no longer be allowed to do that to the United States Army,” Driscoll said.

yeah, sure dude, the Trump administration is totally going to be the one to hold the MIC capitalists accountable!

The Army is launching an initiative to streamline its acquisition process. It is part of an overall effort by the Pentagon to allow the military to more rapidly acquire technology amid growing global threats. Reuters reported last week that the U.S. Army is aiming to buy at least 1 million drones in the next two to three years and instead of partnering with larger defense contractors, it wants to work with companies that were producing drones that could have commercial applications as well. Democratic U.S. Senator Elizabeth Warren this month escalated pressure on the defense industry to stop opposing military right-to-repair legislation.

United Kingdom says it’s still too early to talk about when the 155mm RCH 155 SPGs will enter service. However, they say they plan to achieve minimum operational capability by the end of the decade. This was stated by Junior Defence Minister for Veterans Louise Sander-Jones during a parliamentary question session. According to her, the project is still in the assessment phase and hasn’t even reached the procurement stage yet. The RCH 155 was selected by the United Kingdom as its new main SPG last year, after which an agreement was signed for joint production of the vehicles with Germany. The total program cost is estimated at £3 billion, or $3.95 billion. However, the procurement stage or signing of any firm contract has not been reached to this day, although the country’s defense department confirms the system choice. It’s stated that work is currently underway to refine requirements, pricing, and localization.

Thus, the British are currently left with very limited artillery capabilities, as they transferred all their previous AS-90 155mm SPGs to Ukraine. Swedish Archers are supposed to partially replace them, but this only concerns 14 units, which is insufficient. It turns out we have a case where even despite a huge gap in the country’s arsenal, they continue to deliberate for a long time on how best to procure. Meanwhile, troops continue to remain naked and wait for long construction projects, as with the Challenger 3. Theoretically, the reason for the absence of a contract is the problem of insufficient funding. It’s known that despite many promises and plans, the United Kingdom doesn’t have funds for implementation, and in some places even for maintaining what already exists. Recall that RCH 155s are also supposed to be delivered to Ukraine, and our military are already actively undergoing training. Also recently presented was an updated version of this SPG mounted on a tracked Boxer variant for better stability.

The United States withdrew from the AWACS replacement program in July, removing the strategic and financial base of the program, the Netherlands’ MoD said in a statement on Thursday. The remaining six NATO countries are now exploring alternatives and looking at new partners, it said. NATO operates a fleet of 14 E-3As from Geilenkirchen in Germany that represents Europe’s primary AWACS capacity. The aircraft will reach the end of their lifespan by 2035 and are a source of noise pollution, the Dutch MoD said.

“The commitment remains to have other, quieter aircraft operational before 2035,” Dutch State Secretary for Defence Gijs Tuinman said in the statement. “The withdrawal by the U.S. in addition shows the importance of investing as much as possible in the European industry.” AWACS aircraft with their radar systems and communication equipment play an “essential role” in securing NATO airspace and commanding air operations, the Netherlands said. The US Department of Defense said in July it was canceling the E-7 Wedgetail program, citing significant delays and cost increases, as well as survivability concerns in a contested environment, instead planning to invest in space-based capabilities and additional E-2D Hawkeye aircraft. The E-3A is a modified version of the Boeing 707, an aircraft model dating to the 1950s, with a visually distinctive radar dome planted on the fuselage in front of the aircraft’s tail fin. The E-7 is based on the more modern Boeing 737. The main European alternative to the E-7 is Saab’s GlobalEye, with the company’s CEO Micael Johansson in October saying the company was seeing “huge interest” for the plane, including from NATO, Germany and Denmark, as well as other countries. The system is built around a Saab radar and sensors mounted on a Bombardier long-range business jet. Dassault Aviation has proposed a modified version of its Falcon 10X for the AWACS role, though that system’s prospects took a hit when France said in June it would buy Saab’s GlobalEye.