A reminder that as the US continues to threaten countries around the world, fedposting is to be very much avoided (even with qualifiers like “in Minecraft”) and comments containing it will be removed.

Image is of protestors in Nigeria in 2024.


As I’m sure everybody is aware by now, Trump’s accusation that Nigerian armed groups are unfairly persecuting Christians in the country is a rather bizarre lie, seeking a justification to go in, to quote Trump, “guns-a-blazing”. Whether this is likely to actually occur or is merely a threat, who can really say nowadays? But Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province are targeting people in Nigeria fairly indiscriminately; insomuch that there is a target, it is farmers whose land is being raided and taken in resource conflicts, and their religious affiliation is not usually questioned by those groups before they are pillaged and/or murdered from what I can tell.

The President of Nigeria, Tinubu, has no small responsibility for this state of affairs - enacting IMF “reforms” which have exacerbated hunger, poverty, and unemployment in the service of Western financial institutions. Those who have protested against this state of affairs have faced repression by state security forces. Meanwhile, Tinubu allegedly has strong connections to the DEA, paying large amounts of money to avoid a trial for his actions; the DEA released this statement: “We oppose the full… release of the DEA’s Bola Tinubu heroin trafficking investigation records,” which is certainly not concerning at all - followed by “While Nigerians have a right to be informed about what their government is up to, they do not have a right to know what their president is up to.”

It must be a shame for him that such a loyal subject of empire is facing such scrutiny, and it likely has everything to do with Nigeria’s inexorably growing connections to China (just like pretty much every country on the planet), especially in relation to Nigeria’s massive mineral deposits. It could also perhaps be retribution for Nigeria’s failure to adequately oppose the growing independence of the Sahel.


Last week’s thread is here.
The Imperialism Reading Group is here.

Please check out the RedAtlas!

The bulletins site is here. Currently not used.
The RSS feed is here. Also currently not used.

The Zionist Entity's Genocide of Palestine

If you have evidence of Zionist crimes and atrocities that you wish to preserve, there is a thread here in which to do so.

Sources on the fighting in Palestine against the temporary Zionist entity. In general, CW for footage of battles, explosions, dead people, and so on:

UNRWA reports on Israel’s destruction and siege of Gaza and the West Bank.

English-language Palestinian Marxist-Leninist twitter account. Alt here.
English-language twitter account that collates news.
Arab-language twitter account with videos and images of fighting.
English-language (with some Arab retweets) Twitter account based in Lebanon. - Telegram is @IbnRiad.
English-language Palestinian Twitter account which reports on news from the Resistance Axis. - Telegram is @EyesOnSouth.
English-language Twitter account in the same group as the previous two. - Telegram here.

English-language PalestineResist telegram channel.
More telegram channels here for those interested.

Russia-Ukraine Conflict

Examples of Ukrainian Nazis and fascists
Examples of racism/euro-centrism during the Russia-Ukraine conflict

Sources:

Defense Politics Asia’s youtube channel and their map. Their youtube channel has substantially diminished in quality but the map is still useful.
Moon of Alabama, which tends to have interesting analysis. Avoid the comment section.
Understanding War and the Saker: reactionary sources that have occasional insights on the war.
Alexander Mercouris, who does daily videos on the conflict. While he is a reactionary and surrounds himself with likeminded people, his daily update videos are relatively brainworm-free and good if you don’t want to follow Russian telegram channels to get news. He also co-hosts The Duran, which is more explicitly conservative, racist, sexist, transphobic, anti-communist, etc when guests are invited on, but is just about tolerable when it’s just the two of them if you want a little more analysis.
Simplicius, who publishes on Substack. Like others, his political analysis should be soundly ignored, but his knowledge of weaponry and military strategy is generally quite good.
On the ground: Patrick Lancaster, an independent and very good journalist reporting in the warzone on the separatists’ side.

Unedited videos of Russian/Ukrainian press conferences and speeches.

Pro-Russian Telegram Channels:

Again, CW for anti-LGBT and racist, sexist, etc speech, as well as combat footage.

https://t.me/aleksandr_skif ~ DPR’s former Defense Minister and Colonel in the DPR’s forces. Russian language.
https://t.me/Slavyangrad ~ A few different pro-Russian people gather frequent content for this channel (~100 posts per day), some socialist, but all socially reactionary. If you can only tolerate using one Russian telegram channel, I would recommend this one.
https://t.me/s/levigodman ~ Does daily update posts.
https://t.me/patricklancasternewstoday ~ Patrick Lancaster’s telegram channel.
https://t.me/gonzowarr ~ A big Russian commentator.
https://t.me/rybar ~ One of, if not the, biggest Russian telegram channels focussing on the war out there. Actually quite balanced, maybe even pessimistic about Russia. Produces interesting and useful maps.
https://t.me/epoddubny ~ Russian language.
https://t.me/boris_rozhin ~ Russian language.
https://t.me/mod_russia_en ~ Russian Ministry of Defense. Does daily, if rather bland updates on the number of Ukrainians killed, etc. The figures appear to be approximately accurate; if you want, reduce all numbers by 25% as a ‘propaganda tax’, if you don’t believe them. Does not cover everything, for obvious reasons, and virtually never details Russian losses.
https://t.me/UkraineHumanRightsAbuses ~ Pro-Russian, documents abuses that Ukraine commits.

Pro-Ukraine Telegram Channels:

Almost every Western media outlet.
https://discord.gg/projectowl ~ Pro-Ukrainian OSINT Discord.
https://t.me/ice_inii ~ Alleged Ukrainian account with a rather cynical take on the entire thing.


  • LargePenis [he/him]@hexbear.net
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    11 hours ago

    The 2025 Iraqi Parliamentary Elections are officially over, and we have the final results. The results are not entirely finalised yet, as the Election Commission go over small irregularities which might add or subtract one or two seats from some parties, but we have a pretty good idea of how it looks. I’ll first present the totals in three different sections to make the tables smaller and more readable. Section one will be Shia-majority parties, then Sunni-majority parties, then Kurdish-majority parties.

    Section 1 – Shia-majority parties:

    Party Number of seats My previous prediction Personal commentary
    Reconstruction and Development Coalition 46 40-50 PM Sudani’s party did pretty much in line with my prediction, enough seats to be the clear winner, but not enough to be the sole decisionmakers.
    State of Law Coalition 28 20-30 I’m Maliki’s number 1 hater, but I can’t deny that it was a strong performance by his party. They weren’t the outright winner in any governorate, but they had a strong base across the South and Baghdad.
    Sadiqoun 28 15-25 I fucked up the math there, I wrote that they were going to double their seats, which they actually did, as they went literally from 14 to 28, but I wrote 15-25 for some reason. Very strong performance, they will be the prime pro-PMU voice in Parliament.
    Badr Organization 18 15-25 Again a reasonable performance by Badr, with an underperformance in Baghdad, which was compensated by a surprisingly good result in Diyala.
    Huquq 6 10-15 Horrible performance by the political wing of Kataib Hezbollah. They gave too many people the ick by going too sectarian without having the actual political clout to be sectarian. There’s a big chance that they get completely excluded from the government formation process, with the US veto on them.
    Coalition of State Forces 18 - I completely forgot Ammar Al Hakim’s party when doing my breakdown. They stand for more lukewarm Iraqi isolationist nationalism, with slight Shia nationalist tones. It’s kinda funny because Al Hakim has excellent with Arab leaders such as Sisi and MBS. They completely sucked in the last election, so they are the biggest winners of the Sadrist boycott.
    Iraqi Foundation Coalition 7 5-10 Respectable performance for Muhsin Al Mandalawi’s party considering that it’s a completely new formation. Their real win is that they successfully challenged the ethnic quota system and got Feyli Kurds elected from the normal seats in Baghdad instead of the quota seat.
    Tasmim 6 5-7 Perfect prediction by me here, just needed to flex tbh. Governor Eidani is in trouble though, as his loose coalition in Basra is on the verge of collapsing already due to his guys in the coalition only winning 2/6 of the seats, with three going to members of the isolationist Sheikhi sect and one to a Sunni candidate that will caucus with Taqaddum.
    Smaller and regional Shia parties 25 10-20 Smaller and regional parties did pretty well, even better than expected tbh.

    Section 2 – Sunni-majority parties

    Party Number of seats My previous prediction Personal commentary
    Taqaddum + allies 33 35-45 Slight underperformance by Halbusi’s party. They overperformed in Baghdad but did slightly worse in Sunni-majority regions due to the emergence of Azem and their strong performance. Halbusi is a cunning politician though, there’s already credible rumours about him uniting all Sunni parties in one coalition with over 75 seats in order to be the senior coalition partner to PM Sudani.
    Azem 15 15-20 Azem have successfully positioned themselves as the 2nd largest Sunni party after a very respectable election. How big of a role they will get will depend on if they manage to strike an agreement with Taqaddum.
    Al Siyada (Sovereignty) 9 - I forgot them in my earlier breakdown. A party for more tribal dudes and dudettes. They did well and can potentially leverage their tribal connections to Shia Iraq for a big role in the future.
    Smaller and regional Sunni parties 12 - Normal performance, most of these parties will probably be absorbed by Taqaddum pretty quickly.

    Section 2 – Kurdish-majority parties

    Party Number of seats My previous prediction Personal commentary
    Kurdistan Democratic Party 26 25-35 Slight underperformance by the KDP despite a record number of votes. They fumbled too many seats to the opposition surprisingly, with Ali Hama Saleh’s Halwest denting their numbers in Erbil somehow. Great numbers in Nineveh, probably the most impressive Kurdish performance there ever.
    Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 17 15-20 Nothing too surprising there, the PUK had a normal election result, and they will leverage Bafel Talabani’s cute friendship with Baghdad to get the President of Iraq role again.
    Halwest 5!!! 1-3 Amazing overperformance by Ali Hama Saleh’s new party, probably the most surprising result of the whole election. There’s much excitement in Baghdad for them; Saleh is probably the most valuable addition in the Parliament with his notorious anti-corruption record in the Kurdistan Region.
    Kurdish Islamists + New Generation 8 5-10 With Halwest carrying the opposition vote, NG notably declined in this election. Kurdish Islamists slightly overperformed though, good for them.

    Discussion

    Government formation?

    There are a few possible scenarios. The most likely scenario is that we get a vast coalition of literally everyone, with the bigger parties getting the bigger slices of the cake, and smaller parties getting stuff like the Ministry of Tourism. There’s a wild card this time though, Sudani is actually interested in governing instead of bickering like the Sadrists usually do after winning most seats. There are three possible scenarios for coalition governments without the usual “everyone is invited”.

    American-friendly government: Sudani (46) + Sunni coalition led by Taqaddum (75) + Kurdish coalition (42) + Tasmim (6) + a few smaller parties (10-20) = >165

    Iranian-friendly government: Maliki (28) + PMU coalition (60-ish) + Hakim (18) + Foundation Coalition (7) + PUK (17) + random smaller Shia and Sunni parties (40-ish) = >165

    Impact of Sadrist boycott?

    This election had a bigger turnout than the last election despite the Sadrist boycott. The Sadrists are now treated as pariahs in Iraq, after their failed attempt to influence the legitimacy of the elections by their stupid boycott. Muqtada Al Sadr has a big hill to climb now if he wants his people to return to politics now. I think that the Sadrists now regret their decision, especially with anti-Sadrists taking most of their seats in the south and Baghdad due to the boycott.

    How did our beautiful communists do?

    zero, 0, صفر

    so sad

    • Torenico [he/him]@hexbear.net
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      3 hours ago

      Is there any somwhat cohesive Ba’athist remnant having some kind of political participation these days? I understand Ba’ath Party is banned from existing since 2003, but that wouldn’t stop from A) Forming underground cells to agigate for a potential return? and B) Forming Ba’ath-like parties (reformed) and run for office in either presidential or municipal-level elections.

      I understand it has been over 20 years since the fall of Saddam, and that the Ba’ath Party have lost a lot of legitimacy, maybe? Is there any appetite left in the Iraqi population for Ba’athism? I suppose not but I’m curious about your opinion, since you’ve been to Iraq numerous times and I suppose you’ve talked to people about this.

    • newacctidk [none/use name]@hexbear.net
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      3 hours ago

      I can’t help but feel like Sadr has been wasting time. Man could be a serious powerbroker again if he settled on a strategy. There was a time when, from my pov, he seemed destined to be leading Iraq or be someone you had to cooperate with if you wanted to do anything politically.

    • 420lenin69 [comrade/them, he/him]@hexbear.net
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      7 hours ago

      From the perspective of ideology and policy preferences, do you see any trends?

      There is such a wild mix of parties that receive some significant amount of support that I’m having a hard time working out what the most important political splits and questions are.

      The best I can see, from reading your posts, is that religious / ethnic divides are still relevant but secularism is stronger, with secularists split between pro-Iran and pro-West.

      Meaning the biggest question defining national politics is really Iran vs The West?

      Or is it even less ideological: the politics are chaotic at the national level because local politics are what really matter with the national result explained as simply the aggregate of local politics?