The Russian military has more armored vehicles than it did on the eve of Russia’s wider war on Ukraine in February 2022. And for one main reason. Despite losing as many as 16,100 vehicles in action in Ukraine, the Russians have more than compensated for these losses by pulling nearly 13,000 old vehicles out of long-term storage—and complementing these older vehicles with around 4,000 brand-new vehicles.

also those 16k loss numbers are probably exaggerated since they come from the very trustworthy Ukrainian government, so it’s even worse (or better )

The upshot is that the Russians had 20,000 vehicles in February 2022. 45 months later, they have 21,000. Yes, many of those vehicles are less sophisticated than the newer—and lost—vehicles they replaced. All the same, they represent a potent and enduring armored force. If the Kremlin chooses to use them sparingly. The implication is a foreboding one for Ukraine and any other country Russia may target. “Russia is not exhausting its armored reserves,” explained analyst Delwin, who crunched the numbers. “Modeling forward with constant 2025 loss levels and stable new production, the total fleet remains above 2022 levels through at least 2030.”

How Russia replaced 16,000 lost vehicles

Yes, Russia could struggle to make good major vehicular losses after 2030. That won’t help Ukraine, however—at least not now. There are divergent trends inside Delwin’s overall figures, of course. According to Delwin’s count, which draws on the work of open-source analyst Jompy, there’s been a slight decline in the Russian tank inventory since 2022 even as the Russian armed forces have massively expanded with new regiments and brigades. This makes sense, as the tanks’ main role has changed. As recently as 2022, large formations of tanks—sometimes dozens at a time—would operate independently or in combined-arms formations with other vehicle types. Tank attacks were still feasible … and common. But that was before tiny first-person-view drones were everywhere all the time along the 1,100-km front line of the wider war.

Why tanks matter less in 2025

A handful of $500 FPVs can knock out a million-dollar tank. FPV drones have been responsible for destroying more than two-thirds of Russian tanks in recent months. Now tanks on both sides of Russia’s wider war on Ukraine usually stay far behind the front line, hiding in underground dugouts and only occasionally rolling out to fire a few cannon rounds from kilometers away. Tanks are far less central to Russian battlefield doctrine than they were just four years ago. When Russian tanks do roll into direct combat, it’s usually as the lead vehicles in small mechanized assault groups including infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) and armored personnel carriers (APCs) hauling squads of infantry. Wrapped in layers of improvised anti-drone armor and fitted with mine-clearing plows, the tanks clear a path for the trailing vehicles, detonating mines and absorbing as many drone strikes as possible.

Vital battle taxis

Tanks support the IFVs and APCs, which are now the most important vehicles on the battlefield. They carry and protect the infantry whose job it is to occupy and hold new positions as Russia aims for incremental territorial gains rather than dramatic breakthroughs. And that’s why the number of APCs in Russian service has grown—a lot. Delwin noted “a sharp increase of 38%” in the quantity of infantry-carriers as the Kremlin replaces losses and equips new units with their share of the vehicles. The total number of heavier IFVs, such as the BMP-3, has slightly declined, however, as there were never as many of these vehicles in storage compared to lighter, simpler APCs such as the MT-LB.

While many Russian assaults now involve troops infiltrating on foot or on motorcycles—methods of attack that favor a military that’s flush with manpower and ambivalent toward casualties

—mechanized assaults “remain a consistent tactic,” Delwin wrote, “with monthly losses in the low hundreds during such operations.” “These vehicles remain essential for assaulting fortified positions, though increasingly paired with light motorbike units and infiltration-oriented assault teams,” he added. As long as the Russians mix infantry assaults with mechanized assaults, they’re at low risk of actually running out of vehicles.