@xiaohongshu@hexbear.net
Would have more details, as the other person commented it was about metro lines but it is probably happening with rail in general if it is happening with metro expansions
I think what you were referring to was the subway/metro projects.
Believe it or not, there are still another 10000km of HSR that is scheduled to be built, on top of China’s already impressive 50000km of HSRs (70% of all the world’s high speed rails)!
How many of that will eventually be built isn’t clear, and only time will tell.
The HSRs were supposed to drive up the land value by stimulating development of new and nearby cities, which local governments rely on to finance their expenses. As only ~2300km of the 50000km HSRs are actually making profit, HSR development is tightly connected to the real estate prices, which have been plunging since 2021, and the local governments that have taken out huge debt for their development (especially after 2015) are now in deep trouble with the debt bubble.
China has been trying to build HSRs overseas but the premier project, Indonesia’s Jakarta-Bandung HSR, is running into profitability issue currently as the number of passengers is below expectation while operational costs continue to mount.
Before 2019, when China State Railway Ltd. was still known as the China Railway Corporation (before it was restructured into a joint-stock company), state investment typically remained above 50% of the projects.
From 2019-2020, with the restructured China Railway, the burden is shifted to the local governments, such as the recent Eight Horizontal and Eight Vertical Networks (八纵八横), state investment has fallen to ~20-30%.
Since 2021, state investment accounts for 15% or less of the total investment, with the local governments shouldering the most. For example, the Nantong-Suzhou-Jiaxing-Ningbo line received 15% state funding, while Shaoyang-Yongzhou line received only 9%.
The only recent project that receives significant state funding is the Sichuan-Tibetan railway where it is 100% invested by China State Railway.
Brother, thank you very much for taking the time to write such detailed explanations. I’m replying to 2 of your comments together here, just for convenience.
Overall, I agree with what you said, especially regarding the massive scale of China’s HSR network, the fact that only a small number of lines are operationally profitable, the connection between rail construction and local government financing, and the real challenges faced by overseas projects like the Jakarta–Bandung line. Your general analysis makes a lot of sense to me.
I only wanted to ask for a bit of clarification on a few specific points, as I may not be fully understanding them.
Regarding the figure of “another 10,000 km scheduled,” I was wondering whether this comes from an official planning document or a specific announcement. I’ve seen different estimates depending on which planning cycle or projection is referenced, so I wasn’t sure which source this number was based on.
On profitability, I completely agree that only a very small portion of the HSR network makes money in pure operating terms. I was just unsure about the estimate of “~2300 km,” since most public discussions I’ve come across tend to refer to the number of profitable lines rather than total track mileage. If there’s a specific source behind this figure, I’d appreciate learning more.
At the same time, I was also wondering (at least on the mainland) whether operational profitability is considered a major issue when weighed against the broader contextual benefits of HSR, such as national connectivity, regional integration, productivity gains, time savings, industrial coordination, and long-term development effects. My understanding was that these wider benefits are often treated as part of the rationale, even when individual lines are not profitable on paper.
Concerning the central versus local investment shares after the 2019 restructuring, the overall trend you describe seems very reasonable. I was only unsure whether the precise percentages mentioned (such as 9–15%) are published as national statistics, or whether they are drawn from individual project disclosures. If you have documentation or examples, I’d be grateful to read them.
Lastly, on the relationship between HSR construction and the real-estate downturn, I agree that the two are clearly connected. I was just hoping to better understand how much of today’s local-debt pressure is directly tied to rail investment itself, versus broader fiscal issues and the wider property-sector slowdown.
Related to that, I also wanted to ask whether the current local government debt “crisis” is truly as severe as it is often portrayed, or whether some of the discussion may be overstated, especially considering the structure of the debt, the role of state ownership, and the central government’s capacity to restructure or absorb risks if necessary.
Please forgive me if any of this comes from misunderstanding on my part. I’m not trying to dispute your points, only hoping to understand the sources and assumptions behind these details more clearly. Thank you again for sharing your knowledge.
Regarding the figure of “another 10,000 km scheduled,” I was wondering whether this comes from an official planning document or a specific announcement. I’ve seen different estimates depending on which planning cycle or projection is referenced, so I wasn’t sure which source this number was based on.
On profitability, I completely agree that only a very small portion of the HSR network makes money in pure operating terms. I was just unsure about the estimate of “~2300 km,” since most public discussions I’ve come across tend to refer to the number of profitable lines rather than total track mileage. If there’s a specific source behind this figure, I’d appreciate learning more.
There are only 6 HSR lines that are making profit:
Beijing-Shanghai line (aka Jinghu line, 京沪高铁)
Guangzhou–Shenzhen–Hong Kong XRL (广深港高铁)
Shanghai–Nanjing intercity line (沪宁城际铁路)
Beijing–Tianjin intercity line (京津高铁)
Nanjing–Hangzhou line (宁杭高铁)
Shanghai-Hangzhou line (沪杭高铁)
They all add to ~2300km.
At the same time, I was also wondering (at least on the mainland) whether operational profitability is considered a major issue when weighed against the broader contextual benefits of HSR, such as national connectivity, regional integration, productivity gains, time savings, industrial coordination, and long-term development effects. My understanding was that these wider benefits are often treated as part of the rationale, even when individual lines are not profitable on paper.
Correct. Most public transits are not expected to be profitable, which is why many public transit companies also double as REITs to take advantage of the real estate prices as transit infrastructures are built. The most prominent example right now is Shenzhen Metro that has transfused billions to save the property developer giant Vanke from sinking.
Additionally, many railway companies are being restructured into joint-stock companies to securitize their railway assets as asset-backed securities, in other words, financialization of the public infrastructure to make money. You can read the article from People’s Daily here.
Concerning the central versus local investment shares after the 2019 restructuring, the overall trend you describe seems very reasonable. I was only unsure whether the precise percentages mentioned (such as 9–15%) are published as national statistics, or whether they are drawn from individual project disclosures. If you have documentation or examples, I’d be grateful to read them.
The numbers came from the link I posted in the comment above.
Lastly, on the relationship between HSR construction and the real-estate downturn, I agree that the two are clearly connected. I was just hoping to better understand how much of today’s local-debt pressure is directly tied to rail investment itself, versus broader fiscal issues and the wider property-sector slowdown.
This is a very long story that you can read from my previous effort post here, which really started with the 1994 Tax Sharing Reform. Long story short is that the new tax sharing arrangements prompted local governments to seek non-tax revenues to finance their own budget, and the result was unleashing of the property market, starting from Zhu Rongji’s policy in 1998, accelerated under the 4 trillion yuan stimulus drive in 2007, and the final bang with the 2015 Monetization of Shantytown Redevelopment policy (棚改政策).
Public transits are great ways to stimulate regional and satellite cities growth, and a lot of investment were poured into building new stations to connect the provincial towns and building new cities/residential areas. Some of the areas genuinely benefited from the infrastructure growth, but many others were recklessly built with the local governments competing with one another to boost their GDP numbers and made great career promotions along the way.
The problem now is that there is an oversupply in housing, and with the property prices plunging, the local governments are losing their land premium revenue while having to service a mounting amount of debt taken out for these infrastructure building.
Related to that, I also wanted to ask whether the current local government debt “crisis” is truly as severe as it is often portrayed, or whether some of the discussion may be overstated, especially considering the structure of the debt, the role of state ownership, and the central government’s capacity to restructure or absorb risks if necessary.
Nobody actually knows the true scale of the debt, since much of the debt taken out before 2015 were from shadow banks (LGFVs) and were off the books (at least opaque to the public).
What we do know is that the November 2024 policy to help service the debt (化债 but not sure the exact term in English) was a 12 trillion yuan solution, which
Raised the debt ceiling of the local governments by 6 trillion yuan to borrow new money at lower interest rates to pay off the outstanding high interest rate debt
Allowed the local governments to raise 4 trillion yuan of municipal bonds to service the outstanding debt
At least 2 trillion yuan will be paid per the contracts
This was the last “big policy” being instituted by the central government to help with the local government debt servicing. The exact amount is almost certainly to be much larger than 12 trillion yuan, probably a few times that, since many local governments are still reporting financial distress at the moment.
Thank you very much for taking the time to explain everything so clearly.
From my own understanding, it seems that the central government has been trying to gradually correct many of the structural problems that accumulated in the earlier periods. Measures such as tightening regulation on LGFVs, restricting reckless local borrowing, reducing reliance on land-finance, and shifting the focus away from pure GDP growth toward debt control, risk prevention, and long-term stability all appear to reflect a clear change in direction compared with the past. The recent 化债 program, even if limited in scale, also seems to acknowledge the problem more directly rather than continuing to defer the risks.
At the same time, policies aimed at curbing property speculation, expanding rental housing, discouraging excessive real-estate expansion, and re-emphasizing manufacturing, technology, and the real economy seem to reflect an effort to move away from the development model that took shape during the Jiang and Hu periods, when growth, land revenue, and investment expansion were often prioritized above all else.
Personally, although I fully recognize that China still has many real problems and contradictions, I feel the overall trajectory remains good, especially over the past several years. From my perspective, the Xi era appears to represent a clear break from some of the excesses of the previous development path ( particularly the over-financialization of housing, unchecked local borrowing, and GDP-driven competition between regions ) and a conscious attempt to correct course, even at the cost of slower short-term growth.
Of course, I also understand that these adjustments are extremely difficult and cannot be completed quickly. I’m curious about your own view on this: do you think the current approach is sufficient to resolve these structural issues? Are we broadly moving in the right direction, or do you feel some policies are inadequate or even misguided? I’d really appreciate hearing your perspective as you seem very well read.
@xiaohongshu@hexbear.net Would have more details, as the other person commented it was about metro lines but it is probably happening with rail in general if it is happening with metro expansions
I think what you were referring to was the subway/metro projects.
Believe it or not, there are still another 10000km of HSR that is scheduled to be built, on top of China’s already impressive 50000km of HSRs (70% of all the world’s high speed rails)!
How many of that will eventually be built isn’t clear, and only time will tell.
The HSRs were supposed to drive up the land value by stimulating development of new and nearby cities, which local governments rely on to finance their expenses. As only ~2300km of the 50000km HSRs are actually making profit, HSR development is tightly connected to the real estate prices, which have been plunging since 2021, and the local governments that have taken out huge debt for their development (especially after 2015) are now in deep trouble with the debt bubble.
China has been trying to build HSRs overseas but the premier project, Indonesia’s Jakarta-Bandung HSR, is running into profitability issue currently as the number of passengers is below expectation while operational costs continue to mount.
Thanks for the clarification!
Actually, I think it’s funding for more local infrastructure projects, so rail that’s at the national level might not be affected as much.
Before 2019, when China State Railway Ltd. was still known as the China Railway Corporation (before it was restructured into a joint-stock company), state investment typically remained above 50% of the projects.
From 2019-2020, with the restructured China Railway, the burden is shifted to the local governments, such as the recent Eight Horizontal and Eight Vertical Networks (八纵八横), state investment has fallen to ~20-30%.
Since 2021, state investment accounts for 15% or less of the total investment, with the local governments shouldering the most. For example, the Nantong-Suzhou-Jiaxing-Ningbo line received 15% state funding, while Shaoyang-Yongzhou line received only 9%.
The only recent project that receives significant state funding is the Sichuan-Tibetan railway where it is 100% invested by China State Railway.
You can read more about it here
Brother,thank you very much for taking the time to write such detailed explanations. I’m replying to 2 of your comments together here, just for convenience.Overall, I agree with what you said, especially regarding the massive scale of China’s HSR network, the fact that only a small number of lines are operationally profitable, the connection between rail construction and local government financing, and the real challenges faced by overseas projects like the Jakarta–Bandung line. Your general analysis makes a lot of sense to me.
I only wanted to ask for a bit of clarification on a few specific points, as I may not be fully understanding them.
Regarding the figure of “another 10,000 km scheduled,” I was wondering whether this comes from an official planning document or a specific announcement. I’ve seen different estimates depending on which planning cycle or projection is referenced, so I wasn’t sure which source this number was based on.
On profitability, I completely agree that only a very small portion of the HSR network makes money in pure operating terms. I was just unsure about the estimate of “~2300 km,” since most public discussions I’ve come across tend to refer to the number of profitable lines rather than total track mileage. If there’s a specific source behind this figure, I’d appreciate learning more.
At the same time, I was also wondering (at least on the mainland) whether operational profitability is considered a major issue when weighed against the broader contextual benefits of HSR, such as national connectivity, regional integration, productivity gains, time savings, industrial coordination, and long-term development effects. My understanding was that these wider benefits are often treated as part of the rationale, even when individual lines are not profitable on paper.
Concerning the central versus local investment shares after the 2019 restructuring, the overall trend you describe seems very reasonable. I was only unsure whether the precise percentages mentioned (such as 9–15%) are published as national statistics, or whether they are drawn from individual project disclosures. If you have documentation or examples, I’d be grateful to read them.
Lastly, on the relationship between HSR construction and the real-estate downturn, I agree that the two are clearly connected. I was just hoping to better understand how much of today’s local-debt pressure is directly tied to rail investment itself, versus broader fiscal issues and the wider property-sector slowdown.
Related to that, I also wanted to ask whether the current local government debt “crisis” is truly as severe as it is often portrayed, or whether some of the discussion may be overstated, especially considering the structure of the debt, the role of state ownership, and the central government’s capacity to restructure or absorb risks if necessary.
Please forgive me if any of this comes from misunderstanding on my part. I’m not trying to dispute your points, only hoping to understand the sources and assumptions behind these details more clearly. Thank you again for sharing your knowledge.
It is based on the recent announcement for HSR development under 15th Five Year Plan.
There are only 6 HSR lines that are making profit:
They all add to ~2300km.
Correct. Most public transits are not expected to be profitable, which is why many public transit companies also double as REITs to take advantage of the real estate prices as transit infrastructures are built. The most prominent example right now is Shenzhen Metro that has transfused billions to save the property developer giant Vanke from sinking.
Additionally, many railway companies are being restructured into joint-stock companies to securitize their railway assets as asset-backed securities, in other words, financialization of the public infrastructure to make money. You can read the article from People’s Daily here.
The numbers came from the link I posted in the comment above.
This is a very long story that you can read from my previous effort post here, which really started with the 1994 Tax Sharing Reform. Long story short is that the new tax sharing arrangements prompted local governments to seek non-tax revenues to finance their own budget, and the result was unleashing of the property market, starting from Zhu Rongji’s policy in 1998, accelerated under the 4 trillion yuan stimulus drive in 2007, and the final bang with the 2015 Monetization of Shantytown Redevelopment policy (棚改政策).
Public transits are great ways to stimulate regional and satellite cities growth, and a lot of investment were poured into building new stations to connect the provincial towns and building new cities/residential areas. Some of the areas genuinely benefited from the infrastructure growth, but many others were recklessly built with the local governments competing with one another to boost their GDP numbers and made great career promotions along the way.
The problem now is that there is an oversupply in housing, and with the property prices plunging, the local governments are losing their land premium revenue while having to service a mounting amount of debt taken out for these infrastructure building.
Nobody actually knows the true scale of the debt, since much of the debt taken out before 2015 were from shadow banks (LGFVs) and were off the books (at least opaque to the public).
What we do know is that the November 2024 policy to help service the debt (化债 but not sure the exact term in English) was a 12 trillion yuan solution, which
This was the last “big policy” being instituted by the central government to help with the local government debt servicing. The exact amount is almost certainly to be much larger than 12 trillion yuan, probably a few times that, since many local governments are still reporting financial distress at the moment.
Thank you very much for taking the time to explain everything so clearly.
From my own understanding, it seems that the central government has been trying to gradually correct many of the structural problems that accumulated in the earlier periods. Measures such as tightening regulation on LGFVs, restricting reckless local borrowing, reducing reliance on land-finance, and shifting the focus away from pure GDP growth toward debt control, risk prevention, and long-term stability all appear to reflect a clear change in direction compared with the past. The recent 化债 program, even if limited in scale, also seems to acknowledge the problem more directly rather than continuing to defer the risks.
At the same time, policies aimed at curbing property speculation, expanding rental housing, discouraging excessive real-estate expansion, and re-emphasizing manufacturing, technology, and the real economy seem to reflect an effort to move away from the development model that took shape during the Jiang and Hu periods, when growth, land revenue, and investment expansion were often prioritized above all else.
Personally, although I fully recognize that China still has many real problems and contradictions, I feel the overall trajectory remains good, especially over the past several years. From my perspective, the Xi era appears to represent a clear break from some of the excesses of the previous development path ( particularly the over-financialization of housing, unchecked local borrowing, and GDP-driven competition between regions ) and a conscious attempt to correct course, even at the cost of slower short-term growth. Of course, I also understand that these adjustments are extremely difficult and cannot be completed quickly. I’m curious about your own view on this: do you think the current approach is sufficient to resolve these structural issues? Are we broadly moving in the right direction, or do you feel some policies are inadequate or even misguided? I’d really appreciate hearing your perspective as you seem very well read.
iirc around half the HSR is funded by the local governments that it goes through