One chestnut from my history in lottery game development:

While our security staff was incredibly tight and did a generally good job, oftentimes levels of paranoia were off the charts.

Once they went around hot gluing shut all of the “unnecessary” USB ports in our PCs under the premise of mitigating data theft via thumb drive, while ignoring that we were all Internet-connected and VPNs are a thing, also that every machine had a RW optical drive.

  • Rooty@lemmy.world
    5·
    1 year ago

    Again, how is the attacker going to see a piece of paper that is stuck to the side of the screen? This rule makes sense in high traffic areas, but in a private persons home? The attacker would also need to be a burglar.

    • Krudler@lemmy.worldOPEnglish
      2·
      1 year ago

      It seems that some people are having trouble following the conversation and a basic stream of topical logic.

      The initial premise was that somebody could see your passwords by pwning your machine… And using that to… Turn on webcam so they could steal your password so they could… pwn your machine?

      Lol

      • Hobo@lemmy.world
        1·
        1 year ago

        Nope. The premise is they pwn ANOTHER, less secure, personal device and use the camera from the DIFFERENT device to pwn your work computer. For example, by silently installing Pegasus on some cocky “security is dumb lol” employee’s 5 year out-of-date iphone via text message while they’re sleeping, and use the camera from that phone to recon the password.

        They probably wouldn’t want the $3.50 that person has in their bank account, but ransoming corporate data pays bank, and wire transfering from a corporate account pays even better! If you’re in a highly privileged position, or have access to execute financial transactions at a larger company, pwning a personal device isn’t outside of the threat model.

        Most likely that threat model doesn’t apply to you, but perhaps at least put it under the keyboard out of plain sight?