

In practice, PGP signatures/keys usually work using the “trust on first use” model. The web-of-trust/physical verification of ID documents is a fun idea, but I’ve never met anyone who has used that method in the wild.
The difference between publishing hashes and signatures/keys vs. publishing hashes-only, is that you only need to trust the published keys the first time. They don’t change from year to year. If one year someone hacks ubuntu.com and changes the image files and hashes AND uploads fake keys with signatures, you will notice that the signatures fail to match your saved keys and suspect something fishy.
This will not save you if this is your first time visiting ubuntu.com that happens to be the same day that it has been hacked, but it will protect everyone who has ever visited before and saved the keys. But if the releases were published with hashes-only, every year would be a new hash and a hack would easier slip through.
You can also try to verify the Ubuntu key out-of-band in places other than ubuntu.com, such as in blog posts, old forum/twitter/reddit posts, etc. In principle, hashes could be published on 3rd-party blog posts too, but again they change every year so not as interesting and you won’t find them in as many random places as the pubkeys.




















The last guy on Putin’s naughty list to fly into Moscow got an AA missile up the tail. Put me down for that.