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Cake day: December 1st, 2025

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  • I don’t think this is necessarily a bad thing.

    “Left-Wing” Communism: an Infantile Disorder:

    On the one hand, these people seem to have got muddled when they found themselves in a predicament, when the party’s abrupt transition from legality to illegality upset the customary, normal and simple relations between leaders, parties and classes. In Germany, as in other European countries, people had become too accustomed to legality, to the free and proper election of “leaders” at regular party congresses, to the convenient method of testing the class composition of parties through parliamentary elections, mass meetings the press, the sentiments of the trade unions and other associations, etc. When, instead of this customary procedure, it became necessary, because of the stormy development of the revolution and the development of the civil war, to go over rapidly from legality to illegality, to combine the two, and to adopt the “inconvenient” and “undemocratic” methods of selecting, or forming, or preserving “groups of leaders”—people lost their bearings and began to think up some unmitigated nonsense. Certain members of the Communist Party of Holland, who were unlucky enough to be born in a small country with traditions and conditions of highly privileged and highly stable legality, and who had never seen a transition from legality to illegality, probably fell into confusion, lost their heads, and helped create these absurd inventions.

    What Is to be Done?:

    The government, at first thrown into confusion and committing a number of blunders (e.g., its appeal to the public describing the misdeeds of the socialists, or the banishment of workers from the capitals to provincial industrial centres), very soon adapted itself to the new conditions of the struggle and managed to deploy well its perfectly equipped detachments of agents provocateurs, spies, and gendarmes. Raids became so frequent, affected such a vast number of people, and cleared out the local study circles so thoroughly that the masses of the workers lost literally all their leaders, the movement assumed an amazingly sporadic character, and it became utterly impossible to establish continuity and coherence in the work. The terrible dispersion of the local leaders; the fortuitous character of the study circle memberships; the lack of training in, and the narrow outlook on, theoretical, political, and organisational questions were all the inevitable result of the conditions described above. Things have reached such a pass that in several places the workers, because of our lack of self-restraint and the inability to maintain secrecy, begin to lose faith in the intellectuals and to avoid them; the intellectuals, they say, are much too careless and cause police raids!

    But most characteristic, perhaps, is the amazing top-heaviness of the whole “system”, which attempts to bind each single factory and its “committee” by a permanent string of uniform and ludicrously petty rules and a three-stage system of election. Hemmed in by the narrow outlook of Economism, the mind is lost in details that positively reek of red tape and bureaucracy. In practice, of course, three-fourths of the clauses are never applied; on the other hand, a “secret” organisation of this kind, with its central group in each factory, makes it very easy for the gendarmes to carry out raids on a vast scale. The Polish comrades have passed through a similar phase in their movement, with everybody enthusiastic about the extensive organisation of workers’ benefit funds; but they very quickly abandoned this idea when they saw that such organisations only provided rich harvests for the gendarmes. If we have in mind broad workers’ organisations, and not widespread arrests, if we do not want to provide satisfaction to the gendarmes, we must see to it that these organisations remain without any rigid formal structure. But will they be able to function in that case?

    My understanding of Lenin is because in Russia the communist parties were banned and had constant secret police (gendarmes) raids and spies, it made them accustomed to illegal activities, and were forced to create an organizational structure that could select leaders without democracy (because if you try and organize everyone together in one building for a vote the police just arrest everyone). So one of the problem with the Western communist parties is that they weren’t banned, and became too used to being able to set up collective funds for the trade unions (that police can just steal) and voting for their leaders. Basically that suppression makes the communist parties better at “being illegal” idk.


  • First time for everything? I think the Pol Pot argument has already been debated many times. I think it just comes down to a fundamental disagreement: Was it worth it to help the Khmer Rogue which committed genocide, killing working class people, in order to (debatably) lower the chance of a Soviet-Vietnamese invasion of China that could kill hundreds of millions working class? More than WW2.

    There’s lots of evidence (source) China knew what was happening in Cambodia, disagreed with it, but supported them anyways.

    He said that China did not like the policies of Pol Pot but it would never allow such a strategic area to fall to the Vietnamese. “China will never stand idly by,” he said. “We will take appropriate measures.” Deng strongly hinted that the Chinese response would be military punishment of Vietnam.

    The documents captured by the Vietnamese at Ta Sanh included transcripts of talks between the Chinese leaders and Ieng Sary held on four different occasions. At a meeting on January 13, 1979, Deng scolded Sary for “the cleansing campaign you are conducting—a campaign somewhat excessive and of too broad a scope.” The Khmer Rouge purges, Deng bluntly told him, caused China inconveniences and brought “quite a few negative results.” He pointed to the Chinese example of united fronts with lesser enemies, such as the one formed with Chiang Kai-shek during the anti-Japanese war, and he urged Sary to draw Prince Sihanouk into a front.

    In a perfect world they would have supported Sihanouk but he was in exile in China and the Khmer Rogue was against him. From my understanding the Khmer Rogue were basically the only ones fighting Vietnam. It was pretty much China’s only option if wanted to stop Soviet social-imperialism in Indochina. I think the in Fallaci interview Deng shows his thought process

    Deng: Do you want to talk about the Vietnamese? Look, from a globally strategic point of view, the Vietnamese are merely following in the Soviet Union’s footsteps. As I always say, they’ve become the Cuba of the East. Isn’t it proof enough that they’ve occupied Laos and Cambodia? What else do you need to see before you ask, “What the hell kind of country is this?” We Chinese are completely unable to understand why they’ve opposed themselves to us. During their struggle for independence, we helped them greatly. We never abandoned them — never. Nor did we interfere with their internal affairs. Do you even know the kind of help we gave them over the years? The aid we sent is, comprehensively, about $20 billion. And we never asked anything in return. I’ll say this: $20 billion is a lot of money for a poor country like China.

    Fallaci: But then you killed each other in a conflict that amounted to a small war.

    Deng: Yes, it’s true that we launched a defensive counterattack against them. But, judging by the results, I don’t think that it was very effective. We were too contained; we saw that many countries were against this action, and as a result we were too contained. But the episode proved how determined we are to chastise the tiger. And we reserve the right to chastise the tiger again.

    Fallaci: It’s one of the traumas of our time, Mr. Deng, because we all weep for Vietnam; we all fought against the war in Vietnam. And today some of us are asking, were we making a mistake; were we wrong?

    Deng: No! No, no, we were not making a mistake; we were not wrong. We Chinese do not regret taking their side. It was right to help them, and we will do so every time that a people fights against a foreign invasion. But today in Vietnam the situation is reversed, and we need to confront that situation.

    Fallaci: Yes, but even the Chinese are wrong sometimes, Mr. Deng. How can you possibly take the side of Pol Pot?

    Deng: Listen, we look truth in the face — right in the face. Who liberated Cambodia? Who got rid of the Americans and the American-supported regime of Lon Nol? Was it, perhaps, democratic Cambodia — the Cambodian Communist Party, led by Pol Pot? At the time, Prince Sihanouk had no power; he had been deposed by his own people. We continued to support him regardless, and we accommodated his exile government in Beijing. But Sihanouk was not fighting in Cambodia; the Cambodian Communist Party was. They won, almost with no outside help. And do you know why they had no help? Because almost all the aid sent by China was confiscated in Vietnam. China shares no borders with Cambodia, so, in order to help them, we had to send our aid through Vietnam, and they took everything. Nothing ever reached Cambodia — nothing.

    Fallaci: But Pol Pot…

    Deng: Yes, I know what you want to say. It’s true that Pol Pot and his government made very serious mistakes. We are not ignorant of this. We were not ignorant of it at the time, and, looking back, I can admit that we may have been wrong not to talk to him about it. We’ve said as much to Pol Pot. The fact is that our policy has always been not to comment on the affairs of other parties or of other countries. China is a big country, and we do not want it to seem that we are imposing ourselves. Anyhow, today the reality we have to face has changed: who is fighting the Vietnamese? Sihanouk still has no power; groups like Son Sann are too weak; and the only ones who are able to conduct an effective resistance against the Vietnamese are the Communists who follow Pol Pot. And the Cambodian people are following them.

    Fallaci: I don’t believe it, Mr. Deng. How is it possible that the Cambodians are following the same people who massacred them, dismembered them, destroyed them with blood and terror? You are talking about mistakes, Mr. Deng. But genocide is not a mistake, and genocide is what Pol Pot has done. A million people have been eliminated by Pol Pot.

    Deng: The figure you name is not at all certain. You don’t believe that the Cambodian people are following Pol Pot, and I don’t believe that Pol Pot has killed a million people. One million out of four or five million? That’s nonsense — crazy. Yes, he killed many people, but let’s not exaggerate. He also had the bad policy of removing people from the cities, but let’s not exaggerate. And I tell you that he has the support of the people, and his power grows more every day. And I tell you that opposing Pol Pot — trying to overthrow him — only helps the Vietnamese. Eh! There are people in this world who live outside of reality, who won’t give someone who has made an error the chance to mend his ways.

    Fallaci: Then I’m afraid I’m one of those people who live outside of reality, Mr. Deng. In order to convince us that he truly wanted to mend his ways, Pol Pot would have to resuscitate all the people he slaughtered.

    And I do disagree with Deng here, Pol Pot probably couldn’t be redeemed after Vietnam withdrew.

    “I do not understand,” [Deng] fumed, “why some people want to remove Pol Pot. It is true that he made some mistakes in the past but now he is leading the fight against the Vietnamese aggressors.”

    China also couldn’t just send the PLA to Cambodia either, because they were against the perceived hegemony that the USSR and US commit, and that would be a somewhat hypocritical foreign policy.

    “If we send our soldiers to Cambodia,” Politburo member in charge of international affairs Geng Biao argued, “what kind of impression shall we create in the eye of the Southeast Asian countries and other countries in the world? In addition to the failure in building up the united front against hegemony by uniting with the Third World countries, we shall become another new hegemonic power.” He said that Moscow in fact hoped China would send troops to Cambodia. The Soviet Union would then be able to mobilize world opinion against China and so hinder its modernization.


  • […] allegations of the leadership of the CPC widely circulated after 1956 to the effect that the leadership of the CPSU and Stalin had an overbearing attitude to the Chinese communists […]

    As far as I know China mainly cited Soviet hegemony after Stalin died. I would argue it would be more accurate to change “CPSU and Stalin” to just “CPSU”.

    You speak of Sinified socialism. There is nothing of the sort in nature. There is no Russian, English, French, German, Italian socialism, as much as there is no Chinese socialism. There is only one Marxist-Leninist socialism. It is another thing, that in the building of socialism it is necessary to take into consideration the specific features of a particular country.

    Take how Deng defined MZD thought in the Fallaci interview:

    Deng: We also shouldn’t forget that it was Chairman Mao who combined the teachings of Marx and Lenin with the realities of Chinese history — that it was he who applied those principles, creatively, not only to politics but to philosophy, art, literature, and military strategy. Yes, before the 1960s — or, better, up until the late 1950s — some of Chairman Mao’s ideas were, for the most part, correct. Furthermore, many of his principles brought us victory and allowed us to gain power. Then, unfortunately, in the last few years of his life, he committed many grave errors — the Cultural Revolution, above all. And much disgrace was brought upon the party, the country, the people.

    Fallaci: Would you permit me to tweak your answer a bit, Mr. Deng? When you say “Chairman Mao’s ideas,” are you referring to what is often defined as “Mao Zedong Thought”?

    Deng: Yes. During the Revolutionary War, when the party was still in Yan’an, we gathered together all the ideas and principles advanced by Mao Zedong; we defined them as “Mao Zedong Thought”; and we decided that this thought would guide the party from that point forward. And that is precisely what happened. But, naturally, Mao Zedong Thought was not created only by Mao Zedong. What I mean is: even though most of the ideas are his, other old revolutionaries also contributed to the formation and the development of those concepts — Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De, to name the most important among them.

    If you’re to believe Deng’s definitions, I think it defines MZD thought to be completely compliant with with taking “consideration the specific features of a particular country”.

    Stalin continues:

    Socialism is a science, necessarily having, like all science, certain general laws, and one just needs to ignore them and the building of socialism is destined to failure.

    What are these general laws of building of socialism.

    1. Above all it is the dictatorship of the proletariat the workers’ and peasants’ State, a particular form of the union of these classes under the obligatory leadership of the most revolutionary class in history the class of workers. Only this class is capable of building socialism and suppressing the resistance of the exploiters and petty bourgeoisie.

    2. Socialised property of the main instruments and means of production. Expropriation of all the large factories and their management by the state.

    3. Nationalisation of all capitalist banks, the merging of all of them into a single state bank and strict regulation of its functioning by the state.

    4. The scientific and planned conduct of the national economy from a single centre. Obligatory use of the following principle in the building of socialism: from each according to his capacity, to each according to his work, distribution of the material good depending upon the quality and quantity of the work of each person.

    5. Obligatory domination of Marxist-Leninist ideology.

    6. Creation of armed forces that would allow the defence of the accomplishments of the revolution and always remember that any revolution is worth anything only if it is capable of defending itself.

    7. Ruthless armed suppression of counter revolutionaries and the foreign agents.

    I can see arguments that China accomplished all 7 points. (Although 2 and 4 are arguably partially rolled back for reform and opening up)

    Bourgeois nationalism

    Haven’t read Lenin’s works on this yet so could be somewhat ignorant. “Bourgeois”, which I understand to mean that it’s used to promote national unity instead of class struggle. After 1981, sure one could say that class struggle was deprioritized and any nationalism used could be considered Bourgeois (although I personally see no evidence), but I believe at the time in 1979, just 3 years after the GPCR it would be hard to argue China didn’t focus on class struggle. If anything, I think most would believe the GPCR went too far with class struggle. I don’t think nationalism itself is bad if it’s used in the interests of communism. For example Lenin supported anti-colonial nationalism, and during the Great Patriotic War I’m sure that nationalist propaganda was used, and I assume the same was done in China as there few resources and literacy rates were low.

    China may become a dangerous toy in the hands of American imperialists

    I can understand one believing this up till ~2010 but China now seems to be the main opponent of America which I think refutes America ever having controlled China. The governments just happened to ally because of common interests.

    Proletarian internationalism

    China arguably proportional to it’s economy helped Vietnam during the war more than the Warsaw Pact did, ~$20 billion in aid. By 1979 many didn’t consider the USSR to be lead by a communist party at that point. Deng’s views in the Fallaci interview again:

    Deng: You know, it’s a good thing that no Communist party feels itself to be patriarchally at the center of the movement - that there’s no center, no boss. At the outset, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union filled that role, but it is no longer the party led by Lenin. It is no accident that we regard the Soviet Union as an imperialist country and… yes, imperialist - socialist-imperialist. And since the country led by that party has become an imperialist country, it’s questionable if that party can still be considered a Communist party.

    From their point of view, China was a communist country fighting against an imperialist country. I think it would be hard to argue from their perspective it’s harming proletarian internationalism even if many disagree. It was 600 million proletariat in China against ~350 million in the Warsaw pact? plus ~50 mil in Vietnam. If you count total number of proletariat (which yeah I think is pretty flawed) I could see an argument that it was the Warsaw Pact against internationalism by stationing ships and missiles in Vietnam targeting China, and Vietnam for allowing the Warsaw Pact to do so.

    continue to do business with the genocidal Zionist Entity today

    I get where you’re coming from, but in my opinion by showing that China is willing to trade with anyone, even if they commit genocide, it gives Russia and Iran confidence that they can have a reliable trading partner when NATO countries sanction them. I would argue that Russia and Iran’s economy would be much worse off if they didn’t think China was reliable. I disagree with China on complying with the UN sanctions on Korea because of this. I don’t know much about supply chains but imo sanctioning the Zionists probably wouldn’t have that big of a practical effect as seen that Russia is mostly doing fine despite being targeted by the NATO economies. Imo NATO countries would likely supply the Zionists anything they need, both civilian and military (and arguably already do). Imo the increased confidence of Iran having arguably the most reliable trading partner to back up their economy, and the confidence to give supplies to (nationalist?) liberation movements in like Ansar Allah, Hezbollah, and Iraq, is more important than “moral superiority” China would gain over sanctioning Israel. I’m sure the many appreciate Iranian ballistic missile production and the Hezbollah artillery duals. I could even see an argument that those actions hurt the Zionist economy more than Chinese sanctions would (although they aren’t necessarily mutually exclusive).


  • I can understand why someone would think Vietnam invading Cambodia was a good action. Although I strongly disagree that training counter-revolutionary Afghan guerillas was a strategic mistake by China. I think the context is important. Consider Vogel:

    When Deng returned to work in 1977, the Soviet Union and Vietnam appeared increasingly menacing to him as they cooperated to extend their power in Southeast Asia. Vietnam had allowed the Soviet Union to use the ports that the United States had modernized and left behind at Danang and Cam Ranh Bay. This cooperation would give the Soviet Union the freedom to move its ships into the entire area, from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific. Missile bases in Vietnam were also constructed and held Soviet missiles aimed at China, with Soviet personnel and electronic equipment on the bases to provide technical assistance. And the Soviet Union kept massive numbers of troops along China’s northern border, a situation that seemed more threatening because, to the west, India was cooperating with the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union was poised to invade Afghanistan. Meanwhile Vietnam had already taken over Laos and was preparing to invade China’s ally, Cambodia. […] To Deng, China was in danger of being encircled.

    Sure, I would say that in hindsight the invasion of Vietnam and the support of Pol Pot didn’t help much since the USSR dissolved a decade later. Call it “objectively horrid” or “dirty dealing” as a moral argument, but I don’t consider the decisions illogical given the information available at the time. I think it’s unrealistic to say that China shouldn’t have done anything against the USSR as every single bordering country (except Nepal and Bhutan if I’m not forgetting any?), Mongolia, Korea, Laos, Vietnam, India, and Afghanistan, were friendly with the Soviets. I think most would say that China saw cooperating with the US as optimal since they were subjectively not as much as an immediate threat as the USSR, nothing more than that.

    Deng then spelled out the experience of Chamberlain and Daladier trying to appease Hitler on the eve of World War II. The lesson: because Britain and France gave a weak response to Hitler’s initial forays, Hitler attacked to the West. To stop a threat, one needs to make a firm response, he advised, and the United States is now giving a weak response. The Soviet Union, he said, is now stronger than the United States and Western Europe combined. The Soviet Union has two weaknesses: it needs grain and technology, and the United States is helping with both, helping resolve its weaknesses and thus increasing the risk of a Soviet attack.

    I think its important to emphasis that Deng said “The Soviet Union […] is now stronger than the United States and Western Europe combined”, as in China really saw the USSR as a greater threat than the US. Outside of moral arguments, I still believe the decisions taken given incomplete information were the logically correct actions in China’s interests.


  • Foreign Policy

    Czechslovakia 1968

    Peking Review argues against this better than I can. From Chinese Government and People Strongly Condemn Soviet Revisionist Clique’s Armed Occupation of Czechoslovakia:

    The Soviet revisionist leading clique has all along pursued the counter-revolutionary policy of U.S.-Soviet collaboration for world domination. Since the Glassboro talks, not to mention anything earlier, U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism have struck a series of dirty deals on such important questions as Vietnam, the Middle East and the prevention of nuclear proliferation. The present Czechoslovakia incident is no exception. It is the result of the sharpening contradictions in the scramble for and division of spheres of influence by U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism in Eastern Europe; it is, moreover, the result of the U.S.-Soviet collusion in a vain attempt to redivide the world. The aggression by Soviet revisionism was carried out with the tacit understanding of U.S. imperialism. Since U.S. imperialism has acquiesced in the invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia by Soviet revisionism, how is it possible for Soviet revisionism to oppose the forcible occupation of south Vietnam by U.S. imperialism In fact, Soviet revisionism has long become the No. 1 accomplice of U.S. imperialism in its aggression against Vietnam and the rest of the world. That a big nation should have so willfully trampled a small nation underfoot serves as a most profound lesson for those harboring illusions about U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism.

    Middle East

    Similarily

    It is common knowledge that Soviet revisionism sends Jews to Israel every year. Some 100,000 Soviet Jews have streamed into Israel in the four years since 1970. Public opinion in the Arab countries scathingly denounced this despicable act detrimental to the Arab people’s struggle. The Egyptian paper Al-Ahrum pointed out: “The Soviet Union’s decision could be interpreted as meaning permission for Soviet Jews to fight the Arabs.” The Kuwaiti paper Ar Rai al-Amm said: “It is a conspiracy jointly perpetrated by U.S. imperialism and Russia against the Arab people.” As to Soviet revisionism’s other ugly performances in the Middle East, they became quite notorious much earlier. It amassed ill-gotten wealth by selling arms in the Middle East and pressing buyers for repayment of debts on earlier purchases, which greatly angered the Arabs. In speeches made during the year, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat time and again accused the Soviet Union of making difficulties on the question of arms supplies and dunning Egypt with demands for repayment of debts in an effort to control Egypt through “aid.” The Egyptian President, however, made it clear that “we are not prepared to cede any part of our national will!”

    From Ugly Features of Soviet Social-Imperialism:

    For years the Egyptian people have waged an arduous struggle against Israeli aggression, a struggle which took the lives of many of their fine sons and daughters. In no circumstances should the fighting Egyptian people be pressed for repayment of debts. It stands to reason that all the debts to Soviet revisionism incurred for defence purposes should be written off.

    One of the Soviet revisionists’ sharp practices is to ban arms supplies in times of need. On the eve of the 1973 October War when the Egyptian people were making preparations against aggression, the Soviet revisionists time and again held up delivery of the arms promised. Towards the end of the war when Israel, equipped with numerous U.S. planes and tanks of the latest design, penetrated into the west bank of the Suez Canal, the Soviet revisionists did not hesitate to turn down Egypt’s repeated requests for recoupment at the critical moment of its struggle, compelling Egypt to accept a ceasefire. Throughout the 14 months following the October War, Egypt got no arms replenishment worth mentioning from the Soviet Union. Such is the truth about the much vaunted “powerful” Soviet support for Egypt during its most difficult days.

    Vietnam 1979

    In defense of the 1979 war look at Peking Review again:

    The Chinese frontier forces counterattacked when the situation became intolerable and there was no alternative. To make China a prosperous and strong socialist state and attain the magnificent target of four modernization’s by the end of this century, the Chinese people urgently need an international situation of peace and stability. However, the trees may prefer calm but the wind will not subside. Instigated by Soviet social-imperialism and with its support, the Vietnamese authorities escalated their armed encroachments upon China to intolerable dimensions, compelling us to take action much against our will.

    The Vietnamese authorities are nationalist expansionists. To achieve their ambition for setting up an “Indochina federation” and dominate Southeast Asia, they have acted perfidiously and have unscrupulously committed aggression and expansion. While accepting massive aid from the Chinese people who were able to provide it only by dint of practicing strict economy and at the cost of sweat and blood, the Vietnamese authorities slandered socialist New China which consistently upholds proletarian internationalism, and fanned up national hatred by making distorted interpretations of historical events and even seized Chinese territory by force of arms. Their expansionist ambition has inflated in the past two years. They openly trampled underfoot all norms of international relations, flagrantly invaded Kampuchea and frantically intensified their anti-China campaign

    Instead of striving for economic restoration and improving the living conditions of the Vietnamese people after the war of resistance against the United States, the Vietnamese authorities have made use of the political capital and military equipment gained from the war and depended on Moscow’s backing to hastily push ahead their plan for establishing an “Indochinese federation” in an attempt to dominate Southeast Asia. They have dispatched 50,000 troops to Laos to control the country. They have used 150,000 troops to launch a large-scale war of aggression against Kampuchea. At the same time, they have dispatched armed personnel to repeatedly intrude into Chinese border areas and provoke incidents of bloodshed, and made frequent war cries against China, making China the “main enemy.”


  • I disagree that China “betrayed” the USSR. Even outside of the whole disagreement about Stalin and the USSR recalling industrial advisors from China, there is a lot of idealogical compromises and bad foreign policy the USSR did. In my opinion it was the other way around.

    Soviet Revisionism (Ideological)

    I think one would have to read the secret speech at the 20th CPSU congress to get any of the context. 人民日报 wrote a lot about why it’s a bad “self-criticism” in On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat.

    For more than a month now, reactionaries throughout the world have been crowing happily over self-criticism by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union with regard to this cult of the individual. They say: Fine! The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the first to establish a socialist order, made appalling mistakes, and, what is more, it was Stalin himself, that widely renowned and honoured leader, who made them! The reactionaries think they have got hold of something with which to discredit the Communist Parties of the Soviet Union and other countries. But they will get nothing for all their pains. Has any leading Marxist ever written that we could never commit mistakes or that it is absolutely impossible for a given Communist to commit mistakes? Isn’t it precisely because we Marxist-Leninists always deny the existence of a “demigod” who never makes big or small mistakes that we Communists use criticism and self-criticism in our inner-Party life? Moreover, how could it be conceivable that a socialist state which was the first in the world to put the dictatorship of the proletariat into practice, which did not have the benefit of any precedent, should make no mistakes of one kind or another?

    I recommend one to read the whole of On the Question Of Stalin but some quotes:

    In abusing Stalin, Khrushchov is in fact wildly denouncing the Soviet system and state. His language in this connection is by no means weaker but is actually stronger than that of such renegades as Kautsky, Trotsky, Tito and Djilas.

    Comrade Khrushchov completely negated Stalin at the 20th Congress of the CPSU. He failed to consult the fraternal Parties in advance on this question of principle which involves the whole international communist movement, and afterwards tried to impose a fait accompli on them. Whoever makes an appraisal of Stalin different from that of the leadership of the CPSU is charged with “defence of the personality cult” as well as “interference” in the internal affairs of the CPSU. But no one can deny the international significance of the historical experience of the first state of the dictatorship of the proletariat, or the historical fact that Stalin was the leader of the international communist movement; consequently, no one can deny that the appraisal of Stalin is an important question of principle involving the whole international communist movement. On what ground, then, do the leaders of the CPSU forbid other fraternal Parties to make a realistic analysis and appraisal of Stalin?

    The Communist Party of China has invariably insisted on an overall, objective and scientific analysis of Stalin’s merits and demerits by the method of historical materialism and the presentation of history as it actually occurred, and has opposed the subjective, crude and complete negation of Stalin by the method of historical idealism and the wilful distortion and alteration of history.

    The Communist Party of China has consistently held that Stalin did commit errors, which had their ideological as well as social and historical roots. It is necessary to criticize the errors Stalin actually committed, not those groundlessly attributed to him, and to do so from a correct stand and with correct methods. But we have consistently opposed improper criticism of Stalin, made from a wrong stand and with wrong methods.

    Khrushchov said, “Ah! If only Stalin had died ten years earlier!”[19] As everybody knows, Stalin died in 1953; ten years earlier would have been 1943, the very year when the Soviet Union began its counter-offensive in the Great Patriotic War. At that time, who wanted Stalin to die? Hitler!

    It is not a new thing in the history of the international communist movement for the enemies of Marxism-Leninism to vilify the leaders of the proletariat and try to undermine the proletarian cause by using some such slogan as “combating the personality cult”. It is a dirty trick which people saw through long ago.

    In the period of the First International the schemer Bakunin used similar language to rail at Marx. At first, to worm himself into Marx’s confidence, he wrote him, “I am your disciple and I am proud of it.”[20] Later, when he failed in his plot to usurp the leadership of the First International, he abused Marx and said, “As a German and a Jew, he is authoritarian from head to heels”[21] and a “dictator”.[22]

    In the period of the Second International the renegade Kautsky used similar language to rail at Lenin. He slandered Lenin, likening him to “the God of monotheists”[23] who had reduced Marxism “to the status not only of a state religion but of a medieval or oriental faith”.[24]

    In the period of the Third International the renegade Trotsky similarly used such language to rail at Stalin. He said that Stalin was a “tyrant”[25] and that “the Stalinist bureaucracy has created a vile leader-cult, attributing to leaders divine qualities”.[26]

    The modern revisionist Tito clique also use similar words to rail at Stalin, saying that Stalin was the “dictator” “in a system of absolute personal power”.[27]

    Thus it is clear that the issue of “combating the personality cult” raised by the leadership of the CPSU has come down through Bakunin, Kautsky, Trotsky and Tito, all of whom used it to attack the leaders of the proletariat and undermine the proletarian revolutionary movement.

    [19.] N. S. Khrushchov, Speech at the Soviet-Hungarian Friendship Rally in Moscow, July 19, 1963.

    [20.] M. A. Bakunin’s Letter to Karl Marx, December 22, 1868, Die Neue Zeit, No. 1, 1900.

    [21.] Franz Mehring, Karl Marx, the Story of His Life, Eng. ed., Covici Friede Publishers, New York, 1935, p. 429.

    [22.] Engels to A. Bebel, June 20, 1873, Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscow, 1951, Vol. II, p. 432.

    [23.] Karl Kautsky, Social Democracy Versus Communism, Eng. ed., Rand School Press, New York, 1946, p. 54.

    [24.] Ibid., p. 29.

    [25.] Leon Trotsky, Stalin, an Appraisal of the Man and His Influence, Eng. ed., Harper and Brothers, New York and London, 1941, p. 420.

    [26.] Leon Trotsky, “The Stalinist Bureaucracy and the Assassination of Kirov”, On the Kirov Assassination, Eng. ed., Pioneer Publishers New York, 1956, p. 17.

    [27.] Edvard Kardelj, “Five Years Later”, Borba, June 28, 1953.

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