FP 54 Kurt Engelen - IRSD-KHID-RHID
www.defence-institute.be
Since 2022, sanctions on Russian oil have aimed to choke off the revenues fuelling Moscow’s war in Ukraine. Yet despite embargoes and price caps, Russian crude continues to...

This is an in-depth analysis of Russia’s Shadowfleet by Kurt Engelen from Belgium’s Royal Higher Institute for Defense (RHID). For reference, see also this recent and shorter article by Euromaidenpess.

Here’s the report’s conclusion (via Le Chat Ai) : The shadow fleet is not marginal but central to Russia’s war economy. Stronger enforcement—at sea, financially, and diplomatically—is critical to cutting off Moscow’s oil revenues and weakening its military capacity.

For a summary see comments. Also I can’t edit the title thanks to the new bot.

  • Riddick3001@lemmy.worldOPEnglish
    1·
    2 months ago

    Via Le Chat, Ai.

    Summary: Russia’s Shadow Fleet – Sanctions Evasion at Sea Kurt Engelen, September 2025.

    Context

    Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Western sanctions—especially the EU embargo and G7/EU/Australia price cap on Russian oil—have aimed to cripple Moscow’s war economy. However, Russia has circumvented these measures using a “shadow fleet”: a network of ageing, poorly maintained tankers with obscured ownership, operating outside international regulations.

    Key Findings

    1. Definition and Scale

    • The shadow fleet consists of 600+ vessels (EU sanctions list: 444), primarily Aframax and Suezmax tankers, often 15-20+ years old and flagged under “convenience” registries (e.g., Panama, Liberia, Gabon).
    • 61% of Russia’s seaborne oil exports (worth $90 billion in 2024) rely on this fleet, funding ~60% of Russia’s military budget.

    2. Tactics

    • AIS manipulation (“going dark”) to hide locations.
    • Ship-to-ship (STS) transfers in international waters to disguise oil origins.
    • Reflagging, shell companies, and fake insurance to evade accountability.
    • Environmental risks: Aging tankers threaten ecological disasters (e.g., Baltic Sea, Mediterranean).

    3. Third-Country Enablers

    • India, China, Türkiye, UAE, and Singapore act as hubs for re-exporting Russian oil, often after blending or refining to obscure its origin.
    • India’s imports of Russian oil surged from 0.2% to 40% of its total crude imports by 2024.
    • China receives ~50% of Russia’s shadow fleet oil, using STS transfers near Singapore/Malaysia.

    4. Legal and Enforcement Challenges

    • UNCLOS limits: High-seas jurisdiction rests with flag states, many of which are complicit.
    • MARPOL violations: Poor safety/environmental compliance offers grounds for inspections.
    • Secondary sanctions: US/EU target insurers, ship managers, and ports servicing shadow vessels (e.g., OFAC sanctions on UAE/Singapore firms).

    5. Enforcement Efforts

    • Naval patrols: UK, Nordic/Baltic states (via Joint Expeditionary Force) inspect vessels in the English Channel and Baltic Sea.
    • AI monitoring: Operation Nordic Warden tracks suspicious activity using satellite/AIS data.
    • Port bans: EU’s 18th sanctions package (July 2025) lowered the oil price cap to $47.60/barrel and blacklisted 105+ vessels.

    6. Effectiveness of Sanctions

    • Russian oil exports remain high (~7-8 million barrels/day) but sell at $20-30/barrel discounts (Urals vs. Brent).
    • Revenue loss: Sanctions cost Russia $22-29 billion/year in potential earnings.
    • Loopholes: Shadow fleet operations narrow discounts, undermining price caps.

    Recommendations

    1. Tighten enforcement: Increase naval inspections, leverage MARPOL/SOLAS violations to detain vessels.
    2. Coordinate transatlantic sanctions: Align US (OFAC) and EU vessel designations to close loopholes.
    3. Pressure third countries: Use trade deals to demand compliance (e.g., threaten tariffs on India’s US exports).
    4. Dynamic price caps: Adjust every 6 months to stay 15% below market prices.
    5. Long-term decoupling: EU must end all Russian fossil fuel imports (€21.9 billion purchased in 2024).
    6. Tech-driven tracking: Expand AI tools (e.g., Nordic Warden) to predict and intercept shadow fleet movements.

    Conclusion

    The shadow fleet is not marginal but central to Russia’s war economy. Stronger enforcement—at sea, financially, and diplomatically—is critical to cutting off Moscow’s oil revenues and weakening its military capacity.

    Source: Focus Paper 54, Centre for Security and Defence Studies (CSDS), September 2025