Think about it: A privacy‑focused app the government dislikes used by activists and dissidents gets dragged into a scandal it didn’t technically cause and that scandal becomes political justification for scrutiny and possible investigation
When something protects privacy, shields activists, can’t be surveilled, and is widely used by people the government considers “enemies,”
then any incident, especially a dumb mistake by a public figure becomes an opportunity to push the narrative that “its bad”
Hegseth literally invited a journalist into a private Signal group. The app didn’t leak. He did.
But the public takeaway is shaping up to be:
“Signal is unsafe.”
Activists, dissidents, and “uenemies” use Signal heavily. When an app becomes central to organizing or communication for groups the government dislikes, it moves up the target list.
TL:DR, “This scandal feels like it’s being weaponized to smear Signal and justify government pressure
I agree with the rest, but this one seems kind of pointless. If an attacker has gained access to my device, it doesn’t matter at all how secure my software is, if it’s usable by me then it’s also usable by the intruder.
This is true, and also depends on your threat model. My point was if you’re doing some very cool stuff that’s going to be investigated by a US aligned government, it’s worth thinking beyond the message content when it comes to opsec.