Councilors of the CNE who answer to the two-party system of Honduras declared Nasry Juan Asfura Zablah as president-elect for the period 2026-2030, without concluding the special scrutiny or resolving the challenges presented.

Councilors Ana Paola Hall García and Cossette Alejandra López Osorio of Honduras’ National Electoral Council (CNE) consummated the electoral coup and declared Nasry Juan Asfura Zablah, of the National Party, as president-elect on Wednesday, December 24, for the term from January 27, 2026, to January 27, 2030.

The recognition of Asfura, a candidate publicly supported by Donald Trump, comes amid serious allegations of irregularities during the vote counting process, strong foreign interference, and a conspiracy orchestrated before the November 30 elections.

The allegations were supported by both the ruling Liberty and Refoundation Party (Libre) and the Liberal Party, as well as CNE councilor Marlon Ochoa, who, among other points, objected to the councilors’ refusal to conduct a recount.

Earlier, Liberal Party presidential candidate Salvador Nasralla rejected the National Electoral Council’s (CNE) eventual proclamation of election results. Nasralla strongly criticized the body’s decision, asserting that a large majority of citizens do not support the way the process is taking.

In a message addressed to council members Ana Paola Hall and Cossette López, Nasralla stated that the electoral institutions respond to interests other than the popular will and maintained that the system favors figures linked to corruption. He insisted that his candidacy represents a break with these practices and reiterated that the population rejects the way in which the electoral process is being concluded.

Meanwhile, former Foreign Minister Enrique Reina warned on Wednesday, December 24, about the CNE’s intention to declare a “de facto president-elect” in Honduras without completing the official vote count, thus consolidating the electoral coup. Reina posted on social media: “This is how Honduras wakes up, with an electoral coup underway and a National Electoral Council (CNE) comprised of two illegal members, marching toward declaring a de facto president-elect.”

Reina’s accusation comes after a CNE plenary session held on Tuesday, December 23, where magistrates Ana Hall (Liberal Party) and Cossette López (National Party) rejected the review of approximately 10,000 tally sheets with inconsistencies, thus dismissing the challenges.

For his part, CNE council member Marlon Ochoa described the measure as an electoral coup, arguing that the declaration was made without the completion of the special recount and without resolving the nearly 288 challenges filed, in addition to the approximately 10,000 tally sheets with inconsistencies still pending a vote-by-vote recount.

Ochoa filed a formal complaint with the Public Prosecutor’s Office in Tegucigalpa against the National Electoral Council (CNE) for its intention to declare the results without completing the vote count. As part of his complaint, Ochoa presented 10 new audio recordings that “prove the electoral fraud orchestrated by the two-party system.” These recordings, he indicated, contain the voices of a former president, a former presidential candidate from the Liberal Party, a foreign presidential advisor, the Argentinian Fernando Cerimedo, and other unidentified voices.

The CNE council member emphasized the “most vulgar and blatant foreign interference in the country’s history,” directly pointing to the United States government. Ochoa denounced a campaign of threats by the U.S. to influence the elections, and specifically the candidacy of Nasry Juan Asfura Zablah.

Ochoa highlighted “the litany of actions by the United States government,” including threats of economic sanctions if their preferred candidate, Nasry Juan Asfura Zablah, did not win. He also referred to the sending of millions of text messages to remittance recipients warning of the loss of their funds if the candidate of then-US President Donald Trump did not prevail, which Ochoa concluded constituted a “violation of respect for the sovereign will of the people.”

Marlon Ochoa reiterated that it is a “crime” to declare a president with hundreds of tally sheets still unprocessed and with evidence of inconsistencies. Upon leaving the Public Prosecutor’s Office, he detailed the illegal scheme seeking to sabotage the election results, stating: “What is even more serious is that when one analyzes the universe of tally sheets where the number of voters on the tally sheet matches the number of voters registered on the biometric device, the winner of the election is not the person they are now trying to declare as president of the Republic.”

In the 50s (up til 1972), the US led a total embargo on China, including a food and fertilizer embargo in the express goal of causing a famine that would lead to regime change. By 1959, China’s grain reserves were low and production was not capable of keeping up. It was clear to the CCP that things were heading to an upcoming famine, without imports to cushion the upcoming deficit. Here’s a breakdown of the factors:

• Poor weather leading to poor crop yields. This was the biggest factor despite mainstream rhetoric both in China and abroad: «The Economic Situation in Communist China», Apr 4 1961. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001098172.pdf (p.3 paragraph 13, or p.5 of pdf file). Both the West and Chinese successors of Mao (who were of an opposing faction to him) have very good political reasons to blame him for everything.
• Bad policies leading to poor crop yields: the infamous Four Pest Campaign. While not the main factor for the poor crop yield as modern rhetoric claims, it remained a significant factor. (Same CIA document addresses this in paragraph 14)
• Rampant population growth. The same CIA document, in paragraph 9, notes that agricultural production actually increased in China from 168 to 185 million tons, just not enough to keep up with population growth
• Bad policies leading to poor grain reserves: in 1958, (same CIA document, paragraph 9), grain production increased to 212 million tons. However, CCP allowed free supply of food in the communes’ mess halls instead of its usual rationing, which led to depleting reserves instead of padding it despite a good year.
• Bad policies leading to poor grain reserves: as a rule, China was a food exporter instead of a food importer in the 50s prior to the famine, as it required capital for its industrialization and had little else to offer that other nations would buy. This wasn’t an inherently bad tradeoff (a similar kind of tradeoff would lead to China’s rise as a nation), but became one due to CCP not keeping enough grain reserves that could account for 3 consecutive bad years.

It was therefore in 1959 that the CCP started negotiating grain purchases with Western nations that had a surplus, but they were resisting at that point due to US-led embargo. (The US put significant pressure on its allies to comply with the embargo) https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/an-era-ends-as-china-becomes-an-aid-donor/article978192/ (paywall. Mirror: https://archive.is/9Ksoq). The famine happened as engineered by the US despite CCP’s efforts in preventing it (both in attempting to purchase grain and in transporting their available food around to lower death toll). Death tolls are likely exaggerated (all state actors around the world had reason to, again due to political expediency vis-à-vis Mao), but the famine did indeed happen. The lowest estimates are around 5 million (figure Mao gave to US diplomats), up to 30 something million (extremely unlikely).

After the famine worsened in winter 1961, Canada and Australia had enough of being complicit in genocide and decided to defy the US embargo and sent China grain (both paid and given). This was sufficient to stop the famine and bought them considerable goodwill from the PRC for a few decades. At this point, the CIA calculated that if Canadian and Australian grain imports stopped, it would be enough to send China back into the worst parts of the famine (thereby confirming that if grain imports started in 1959, there wouldn’t have been a famine to begin with). It then lamented at the poor cooperation of US allies in this attempted genocide in the CIA report «Communist China: Economic Performance in 1962», Dec 3 1962. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000402879.pdf (p.8-9; or p.10-11 of pdf file).

Side note that doesn’t really affect how the events unfolded in either CCP actions nor US intentions: In February 1961, the CCP expressed a need for urgent grain purchases to the Soviet Union. Khrushchev offered 1 million tons of grain and half a million tons of Cuban sugar on a loan basis. China agreed to use the sugar loan and asked to keep the grain offer in reserve (Lorentz M. Lüthi’s book «The Sino-Soviet Split»). It then however used part of the offer soon after (200 000 tons, according to Barbara Barnouin in «Zhou Enlai: A Political Life»). This was shortly before the Sino-Soviet split was complete. The loan was paid back with Canadian grain. That China negotiated for grain from Canada in 1959, and only from the Soviets in 1961 after the famine got really bad, spoke volumes about how bad Sino-Soviet relations were at that point. Also, it is probably slightly unfair to say that CCP successors to Mao blamed him solely for political expediency; there was good grounds to say if CCP did not make the numerous poor policy decisions listed above, the famine may not have happened (or at least not have been as bad) despite the poor weather and the US genocide attempt. CCP is inherently pragmatic and considers being able to weather both natural disasters and hostile factors its mandate. This was likely a large part of why it declared the GLF famine “mostly man-made [by itself]” despite the fact that the men that intentionally made the famine were in Washington and not Beijing.

from the linked CIA doc:

Failure to import 5 million mt of grain in 1963 might reduce by 3 to 4 percent the total caloric availability, thereby diminishing labor productivity … and causing increased rural dissatisfaction. … The cumulative effects of prolonged malnutrition … could lead to a level of unrest that would tax the police powers of the regime.

The U.S. Coast Guard is waiting for additional forces to arrive before potentially attempting to board and seize a Venezuela-linked oil tanker it has been pursuing since Sunday, a U.S. official and a source familiar with the matter told Reuters. The ship, which maritime groups have identified as the Bella 1, has refused to be boarded by the Coast Guard. That means that the task will likely fall to one of just two teams of specialists - known as Maritime Security Response Teams - who can board vessels under these circumstances, including by rappelling from helicopters. The days-long pursuit highlights the mismatch between the Trump administration’s desire to seize sanctioned oil tankers near Venezuela and the limited resources of the agency that is mainly carrying out operations, the Coast Guard.

Unlike the U.S. Navy, the Coast Guard can carry out law enforcement actions, including boarding and seizing vessels that are under U.S. sanctions. Trump earlier this month ordered a “blockade” of all sanctioned oil tankers entering and leaving Venezuela, in Washington’s latest move to increase pressure on Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro. The Coast Guard has in recent weeks seized two oil tankers near Venezuela. After the first seizure, on Dec. 10, U.S. Attorney General Pam Bondi posted a 45-second video showing two helicopters approaching a vessel and armed individuals in camouflage rappelling onto it. A Saturday social media post by the Department of Homeland Security, which oversees the Coast Guard, showed what appeared to be Coast Guard officers aboard the Gerald Ford aircraft carrier getting ready to depart and seize the Centuries tanker, the second of the ships boarded by the U.S. A U.S. official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said the Coast Guard officials on the Ford were from a Maritime Security Response Team and at the time too far from Bella 1 to carry out a boarding operation. “There are limited teams who are trained for these types of boardings,” said Corey Ranslem, chief executive of maritime security group Dryad Global and previously with the U.S. Coast Guard.

The Department of Homeland Security did not immediately respond to a request for comment and Reuters could not determine what, if any other reasons, have led to the Coast Guard not seizing the vessel yet. The administration could ultimately choose to not board and seize the vessel. The White House said that the United States was still in “active pursuit of a sanctioned dark fleet vessel that is part of Venezuela’s illegal sanctions evasion.”

LIMITED RESOURCES

The U.S. Coast Guard is a branch of the armed forces but a part of the Department of Homeland Security. The United States has assembled a massive military force in the Caribbean, including an aircraft carrier, fighter jets and other warships. Ospreys and additional MC-130J Commando II aircraft arrived in Aguadilla, Puerto Rico in recent days, according to a separate source. The Coast Guard has far fewer resources in place. The service has long said that it lacks the resources to effectively carry out a growing list of missions, including search and rescue operations and drug seizures. In November, the Coast Guard announced that it had seized about 49,000 pounds of drugs worth more than $362 million in the eastern Pacific. “The Coast Guard is in a severe readiness crisis that is decades in the making,” Admiral Kevin Lunday, who leads the Coast Guard, told lawmakers in June. For the fiscal year ending September 2026, the Coast Guard requested $14.6 billion in funding. It will receive an additional $25 billion through a sweeping spending and tax legislation, known as the “One Big Beautiful Bill Act.” “Our Coast Guard is less ready than in any other time in the past 80 years since the end of World War Two. The downward readiness spiral we are on is not sustainable,” Lunday said earlier this year.

In a written response to Conservative MP Ben Obese-Jecty, defence minister Luke Pollard said “there are no plans to extend the out-of-service date for Warrior beyond 2027, and as such an extension is not under consideration.” The answer makes clear that the Army will not revisit the decision to retire the long-serving infantry fighting vehicle, despite ongoing concern about potential armoured capability gaps. Pollard said the department’s focus is now on delivering the ambitions set out in the Strategic Defence Review. He told Parliament that priority is being given to “achieving the Strategic Defence Review’s vision for a tenfold increase in British Army lethality over the next decade,” with modern armoured fighting vehicles forming part of a wider force structure. The minister added that future capability will rely on “survivable and lethal platforms” operating alongside “new layered systems of attritable and consumable platforms,” signalling a continued shift away from extending legacy equipment and towards mixed, multi-layered force designs.

y’know, maybe before you switch to “attritable and consumable” platforms, you should make sure you actually have the industrial capability to make enough things that you can indeed treat them as consumable?

Recently, we reported that the government confirmed that Project ATILLA, the Army’s plan to convert retired Warrior infantry fighting vehicles into optionally crewed minefield-breaching platforms, has now advanced beyond its initial concept work and entered the early stages of commercial competition. Responding to a written question from Conservative MP Ben Obese-Jecty, Defence Minister Luke Pollard said ATILLA “has progressed from considering conceptual elements such as evaluating project feasibility” and is now preparing to move into the Invitation to Tender stage. He did not provide a date for the formal end of the concept phase, but the answer makes clear that the programme has already passed that milestone. The clarification follows earlier disclosures setting out the structure and ambition of ATILLA. As previously reported, the programme aims to turn surplus Warrior hulls into heavy, attritable uncrewed ground vehicles capable of breaching minefields for the Royal Engineers. A Prior Information Notice published in August revealed the MoD’s intention to procure up to six converted Warriors as a Minimum Deployable Capability, fitted with front-end breaching equipment and able to operate either with a crew or remotely. From the outset, ATILLA has been designed as a spiral-development effort. Phase 1 will deliver the initial six vehicles for operational use and experimentation, while Phase 2 will focus on advancing autonomy and refining requirements for a future purpose-built heavy UGV fleet. Industry bidders must meet a stringent entry test, with only suppliers able to deliver six fully functioning optionally crewed breaching vehicles within the set time limits allowed to progress.

The logic behind the project is straightforward: Warrior’s retirement from frontline service leaves the Army with robust tracked hulls offering the mobility, protection and payload needed for high-risk engineering tasks. Converting them avoids the lengthy timelines and significant expense associated with designing a bespoke platform from scratch, and gives the Royal Engineers a survivable option for clearing minefields without placing crews directly in harm’s way. According to the Ministry of Defence, by cutting through minefields, the device clears explosives and pushes them aside, opening a safe path for troops to move faster and more securely towards critical enemy positions or key objectives, outpacing current methods in speed and safety. “The device, called WEEVIL, was developed collaboratively by the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl) and Pearson Engineering Ltd – a British company based in the north-east – using the latest tech. WEEVIL can clear minefields quicker and safer than present capabilities, reducing risk to soldiers on the front line. Current mine-clearing methods include the TROJAN Armoured Vehicle, which requires a three-person crew to operate directly within hazardous areas.” “The system prototype currently uses the Warrior Infantry Fighting Vehicle, fitted with a full-width mine plough, advanced remote-control system, and vehicle-mounted cameras. This allows it to be operated by a single person from several miles away from danger and is expected to be able to adapt to work with any suitable vehicle platform. The ground-breaking trials are set to continue with the British Army, who will push the robotic system to its limits, providing vital insight to inform future mine-clearing capabilities. The prevalence of anti-tank and anti-personnel mines in modern warfare to slow troop movements has been highlighted by the conflict in Ukraine.”

China’s military aerospace sector is clearly in a period of rapid growth and innovation right now. As it continues to roll out new combat aircraft designs, crewed and uncrewed, for domestic use, it’s also lining up new exports of at least three of its in-production fighters. That’s one finding from the unclassified version of an annual Pentagon report to Congress on China’s military, released yesterday. The latest Pentagon assessment of the military and security developments involving China doesn’t include much in the way of new information on the individual aircraft programs for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The report does mention the debut in the last 12 months of “two stealth aircraft with novel tailless design features,” the aircraft that are now known informally as the J-36 and the J-XDS. Other debuts highlighted include the land-based J-35A fifth-generation combat aircraft and the J-15D carrier-borne electronic warfare aircraft. Also of note is the statement that the new airborne early warning and control aircraft based on the Y-20B transport is “meant to identify and track advanced stealth aircraft.”

Perhaps the most significant military aerospace development is the assertion in the report that China aims to produce six aircraft carriers by 2035, which would provide a total of nine (China’s third, the Fujian, began its inaugural sea trials in May). Recent imagery indicates that China is progressing with work on a new aircraft carrier, its fourth, which is expected to introduce nuclear propulsion. There are increasing reports that Beijing may also still be working on at least one more conventionally powered carrier, too. If these plans are accurate, then the gap between China’s fleet of carriers and the U.S. Navy’s 11 active nuclear-powered supercarriers is growing smaller at an even faster pace.

When it comes to China’s fighters for export, the report identifies the fifth-generation Shenyang FC-31 (export variant of the J-35), the fourth-generation Chengdu J-10C, and the JF-17, which it defines, somewhat puzzlingly, as a light combat aircraft. The last of these, also named Thunder, is a China-Pakistan coproduction, not used by the PLA. In terms of orders already achieved, the Pentagon states that, as of May 2025, the FC-31 has no sales. However, it does say that there are “interested clients,” which include Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The first prototype FC-31 took to the air in 2012 and was followed, in 2016, by a significantly reworked and greatly refined version, which we discussed in detail at the time. More recently, developmental focus has been on the J-35 version for carrier-based service with the PLA Navy. Alongside this, Shenyang has also developed the J-35A, a land-based stealth fighter that has been under development for some time and which publicly emerged late last year. The long-term PLA Air Force plans for the J-35A remain unclear, but the carrier-capable J-35 may well now be in operational PLA Navy service. Since the base design was developed primarily for export, foreign sales are almost certainly still being sought. Somewhat surprising is the fact that the Pentagon doesn’t link Pakistan with a potential FC-31 order. After all, there had been a previous announcement of official Pakistani plans to acquire a land-based version of the jet.

As for Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, all these nations are known to be looking for new fighters. Egypt was once destined to receive 24 Su-35s from Russia, before the threat of U.S. sanctions and a teased offer of F-15s put an end to that sale. In particular, Washington had said it would put sanctions on Cairo under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). In the event, it appears those same Su-35s, or at least some of them, ended up in Algeria. In Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, the FC-31 would join a relatively packed list of competitors for that country’s next batch of fighters. Saudi Arabia was long expected to buy more Eurofighter Typhoons, in a deal that would be brokered by BAE Systems of the United Kingdom. With that potential deal held up by concerns over Saudi human rights abuses, Saudi Arabia entered talks to buy 54 Dassault Rafale fighters, as we reported back in 2023. More recently, Boeing confirmed that it was offering the F-15EX Eagle II to Saudi Arabia, while last month it was reported that the Trump administration was weighing up the sale of up to 48 Lockheed Martin F-35As to the kingdom. Selling the stealth jet to Saudi Arabia would be a significant policy shift, with Washington previously being unwilling to export F-35s to Arab states in the region, for fear of upsetting the strategic balance in relation to Israel. The same applies to the United Arab Emirates, where, like in Saudi Arabia, Beijing seems to be offering its stealthy FC-31 as a direct alternative to the F-35. An arms package for the United Arab Emirates, approved at the end of the previous Trump administration and valued at up to $23.37 billion, included 50 F-35As, among other weapons. In 2021, the Emirati government reportedly said it wanted to scrap the plan, due to concerns over stringent safeguards to protect these systems — somewhat ironically — against Chinese espionage.

For the J-10C, the report notes that the only exports of this type are the 20 units delivered to Pakistan. These are part of two previous orders from Islamabad totaling 36 aircraft since 2020. It’s unclear when the remaining jets are set to be delivered to the Pakistan Air Force. Since entering Pakistani service, the J-10C saw its combat debut in this year’s clashes between India and Pakistan. Many observers pointed to the potentially significant impact made by the jets, especially in conjunction with their much-vaunted PL-15 air-to-air missiles — the latter of which you can read about in depth here. Regardless, China went into overdrive to publicize the claimed success of the J-10C and its Chinese-made missiles in Pakistan Air Force hands. Meanwhile, Egypt, Uzbekistan, Indonesia, Iran, and Bangladesh are all said to have expressed interest in the J-10C. Aside from the aforementioned Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, and Bangladesh are all known to be looking for new fighter equipment. Indonesia signed a contract for the 42 Rafales, which it followed up by announcing plans to buy up to 24 F-15EX fighters, specifically a derivative known as the F-15IND, as you can read more about here. The prospects of a J-10C sale in Iran may be somewhat better. Iran’s geriatric air force has been particularly hobbled by historic arms embargoes and the country’s increasing pariah status in the global community. In the past, Iran has been linked with a potential transfer of Su-35s, which so far hasn’t materialized, while the country’s fighter force almost certainly suffered heavy attrition in the conflict with Israel earlier this year. As for Bangladesh, this country may also now be out of the market for a new fighter. Earlier this month, it was reported that it had signed a letter of intent with Italy’s Leonardo to buy an undisclosed number of Typhoons.

Turning to the JF-17, which is the lowest-end and cheapest offering of the three fighters, has also done the best in terms of exports. As of May 2024, the Pentagon records JF-17 sales to Azerbaijan, Burma, and Nigeria, as well as Pakistan. The report also says that, as of 2024, negotiations were underway regarding a possible JF-17 transfer to Iraq. Iraq is an intriguing candidate customer. Although it has been a keen customer of Chinese arms for many years, the country’s fighter needs would appear to be well met by its Lockheed Martin F-16s — provided they are still operational. Back in 2023, the Pentagon reported that the F-16IQ had become Iraq’s most reliable platform for carrying out airstrikes against ISIS terrorists, at least in part due to a shortage of spare parts for Iraq’s Russian-made attack helicopters as a result of the war in Ukraine. U.S. and Iraqi authorities were said to be looking into the possibility of modernizing the F-16IQ’s notoriously limited air-to-air capabilities. It’s unclear why Iraq might have started to look at buying JF-17s. One possibility is simply to increase the size of its fighter fleet and do it more cheaply, but it’s also possible that Iraq’s F-16s may be suffering from some of the same kinds of problems they did in the past. Indeed, as of 2020, it was announced that the withdrawal of maintenance teams from Iraq meant that its F-16 fleet was at risk of effectively ceasing to exist.