The cost of all three variants of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter are increasing by as much as roughly 11 percent, according to the Pentagon. A spokesperson for the F-35 Joint Program Office (JPO) confirmed to Breaking Defense that the average flyaway cost — a metric that measures when a jet has all the equipment it needs for delivery — of the conventional takeoff and landing F-35A rose to $92 million in the aircraft’s 18th and 19th production lots, which will deliver over the next two years. That’s up from the $82.5 million price tag of the jet’s most recent group of production contracts spanning 2023 to 2026, a growth of 11.5 percent. Similarly, the price of a jump jet F-35B rose to $121.4 million across lots 18 and 19, while the carrier-capable F-35C climbed to $110.8 million. For the F-35B, that’s an increase of 11.4 percent compared to a previous price tag of $109 million; the F-35C had the smallest increase of 8.5 percent set against a prior cost of $102.1 million. Air & Space Forces Magazine was first to report the new figures.

In response to a Pentagon document known as a modernized selected acquisition report (MSAR), which revealed rising buying costs for the stealth fighter, F-35 manufacturer Lockheed Martin previously said the report “shows the combat-proven F-35 program moving into full-rate production, resuming high-volume development deliveries and growing globally.” The company added that the report “also shows that the hard work has shifted from proving the basic aircraft to executing major modernization, improving fleet readiness and controlling long-term sustainment and integration costs.” Lockheed referred back to that statement today when asked to comment on the increased flyaway costs. The F-35 program has been battered by inflation, rising prices of raw materials and supply chain issues, which drove up costs for lot 18, the Pentagon previously told Breaking Defense. Rising rates even sparked a cost dispute with Switzerland, culminating in Bern trimming its buy of the stealth fighter. The flyaway cost includes government-furnished equipment outside the scope of Lockheed’s contract, such as the jet’s F135 engine built by RTX subsidiary Pratt & Whitney. The aircraft’s upgraded radar is supplied by Northrop Grumman, though delays have forced the Pentagon to accept new aircraft without the nose-mounted sensor, Breaking Defense previously reported. It’s not clear exactly how much those features may have influenced the overall price increase.

Projected F-35 buying costs are going up by over $50 billion across the program’s lifespan due to factors like upgrades, shifting buy profiles and a surge in spare parts to boost lackluster readiness rates. Those costs, detailed in the MSAR document, also showed the F-35’s total lifecycle costs — the sum total the government expects to spend to buy and sustain the fighter — dipping beneath $2 trillion after surpassing that number in 2024. One set of upgrades underway for the fighter is meant to enhance its engine, while a separate is intended to deliver a new power and thermal management system to address cooling challenges. Another modernization program known as Block 4 — which is over budget and years behind schedule — will add a suite of capabilities for the fighter, officials say. Block 4’s computing backbone, known as Technology Refresh 3, has still not been certified for combat, relegating jets delivered over the past two years to training. A total of 20 customers globally, including the US, are on contract for the F-35. International customers can have differing requirements, which may come with varying costs. Foreign buyers also largely acquire the A variant, though some are procuring the F-35B; only the US flies the F-35C. The Pentagon is planning to acquire 148 aircraft each in lots 18 and 19, for a total of 296 aircraft. Lockheed said in September 2025, when the contract was finalized, that the increase in price per jet was below the rate of inflation, while the JPO has said that the cost of the fighter’s airframe is “consistent” compared to prior years when adjusting for inflation.

With Congress headed on break, a continuing resolution in place through Dec. 11 and no hope for a near-term defense supplemental, Defense Department planners are scrambling to stretch available funds and make it through the end of the fiscal year.

really cool that the world’s allegedly most powerful military is getting put on “desperately waiting on my salary to come in” end-of-month rations. hope you enjoy instant ramen! (although tbh, that’d probably still be better than the “food” they were serving to those sailors…)

The issue took center stage this week, thanks to a Thursday statement from Rep. Rosa DeLauro, the top Democrat on the House Appropriations Committee, where she said the Pentagon is making a “secretive attempt to siphon” billions of dollars away from the National Institutes of Health through an “interagency agreement.” “These funds were provided for lifesaving medical research, not as extra money for the Department of Defense,” she added. “It is no secret that the Department of Defense is facing enormous financial pressure because of President Trump’s war of choice with Iran. But the Trump administration cannot make American patients, families, and scientists pay the price.”

uh, yeah, pretty sure they can since you’re not going to actually fucking do anything to stop them?

In a statement to NOTUS, NIH said the proposed agreement was around a collaboration on medical technologies, and notably, neither NIH or DeLauro said a deal was ever consummated. Appropriations Committee chairman Tom Cole, R-Okla., said in a statement late Friday that “not one dollar has been transferred from the NIH to the Department of War.” DeLauro’s office did not respond to a request for additional details, and neither did DoD and the Office of Management and Budget. DoD also did not respond to multiple requests for comment about ongoing FY26 budget pressures. Regardless of the specifics around the NIH claims, the fact the Pentagon’s budget is under stress is no secret, thanks to a mix of six months of military operations against Iran, National Guard deployments inside the US, increased fuel costs, end-strength overages and the lack of full reimbursement from the Department of Homeland Security for DoD border operations. The White House in June sent lawmakers a supplemental spending request that included $67.1 billion in defense funds, though Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth later said that he expects “certain aspects” of the Iran war to cost $37.5 billion through the end of September. However, with Congress effectively shuttered until after November’s elections, that supplemental isn’t coming anytime soon, if it ever gets done.

Finding outside sources of money and putting them towards the Pentagon is just one of a handful of options available to defense budget planners, a pair of former defense officials told Breaking Defense. But none of them, they said, are pretty. “Their problem right now is the operating costs that they didn’t plan for,

YOUR WHOLE JOB IS TO FIGHT IMPERIAL WARS HOW DID YOU NOT FUCKING PLAN FOR FIGHTING AN IMPERIAL WAR!?

and that has to be solved by 26 days from now,” a former senior defense official granted anonymity to speak freely, told Breaking Defense this week. “If I were still in the building, I would say, ‘I’m probably screwed now.’”

Viable Options And Roadblocks

Both the former senior official and Elaine McCusker, an acting comptroller during the first Trump administration, spoke to Breaking Defense before DeLauro’s statement came out. However, they broadly laid out some of the available options to get operations and maintenance (O&M) funds lined up. One option is via DoD requests to reprogram money between coffers. Broadly speaking, Pentagon officials have more legal wiggle room to reshuffle O&M as they see fit — cancelling training exercises, for example, is fully within the department’s decision space. In July, US Pacific Air Forces Commander Gen. Kevin Schneider warned that the military would do just that and was reevaluating its upcoming exercise schedule to help preserve “readiness” in the face of increased commitments around the globe, including the Middle East. Such moves are likely more wide-spread, especially for the Navy given its operational tempo in the Middle East. “[You] can’t really let the services go ahead, go full speed ahead, on training and stuff, on the 45 percent chance that more money will show up because we’ll be broke in the operating accounts if we don’t slow down,” the former defense official added.

Another option is to seek Congressional approval to move dollars between accounts. In early July, for example, the Pentagon asked Congress for permission to reroute roughly $4.3 billion from FY26 coffers in order to pay for “higher priority items,” including increased personnel and operational costs around the globe. Lawmakers on the appropriations committees did not respond to questions about the status of this reprogramming request, but $4.3 billion is just a fraction of Hegseth’s $37.5 billion Iran estimate and the $67.1 billion requested for defense in the supplemental ask. “Reprogramming requests submitted to Congress, if approved, would help with some immediate cash flow challenges, particularly in the military personnel account, but the sources to fund these reprogramming actions are not good and will need replenished as well,” McCusker explained.

you’ve heard of debasification, now get ready for robbing-peter-to-pay-paul-ification

“The Pentagon is close to the cap on general transfer authority (GTA),” she added. “If it does not get supplemental relief, it will have to defer maintenance

oh well good thing the military doesn’t have longstanding and evergrowing problems with maintenance then!

and potentially stall acceleration of modernization and procurement. Some bills could carry into next year.” But given the Pentagon is in the middle of a major modernization push, and how officials always like to note that delayed modernization usually costs more down the road, cutting technology buys to fund O&M isn’t ideal. Another option on the table to cut costs by furloughing civilian workers or cutting back their hours. “You could tell civilians to only work three days a week, but the question is how much you can do this late in the year that would really move the needle,” the former senior defense official added. “You could also slow purchases of things that you normally buy with O&M funds and hope for relief later.” Then there are more creative “maneuvers,” like using funds from the $152 billion reconciliation pot to pay the bills, the former senior defense official said. While that money has been earmarked, the Pentagon could shift funding around, similar to how the department diverted $3.8 billion to pay for the wall along the southern border in 2020. Notably, the Pentagon has to get its reconciliation funding on contract this year or lose roughly 8.3 percent of its funds. In theory, that means the department could do some acrobatics and shift money from procurement to O&M, then shift reconciliation to cover those holes in procurement — but eventually, something gets cut. While some of DoD’s funding pressure could abate on Oct. 1 when FY27 starts, it still has funds to backfill and will likely be under a continuing resolution until early December. “The financial challenges will only get worse until a final appropriations bill and supplemental are passed,” McCusker said. “Always wasteful and disruptive, a CR will be particularly destructive this year as only the 2026 base budget will extend. This means an immediate budget reduction of more than $150 billion or about $400 million per day compared to what was requested and planned for 2027.”

Maintenance delays have cost the Navy’s attack submarine fleet more than 41 years they could have been in operation—and those waiting to be taken out of service could cost more than $3 billion over the next five years, according to a recent watchdog report. The main problem is that shipyards are simply overloaded with work, the Government Accountability Office wrote in an Aug. 27 report.

well, good thing the US government didn’t take any actions that would send even more ships into a maintenance tailspin!

“The USS Pasadena entered inactive idle status on January 1, 2025 and is not expected to be inducted" into Puget Sound Naval Shipyard "for decommissioning until November 15, 2028 (1,414 days)—due to shipyard capacity constraints,” the report said.

stuff like this is probably going to happen to basically all the ships involved in the war against Iran btw

“During this time, the attack submarine is unable to be operational since its dive certification is expired, but is still fully crewed with sailors.” In the meantime, the Navy is using the inactive submarine to train crews but its nearly-four-year delay is costing the services about $300 million in operating and support costs, according to the GAO’s analysis. More than a dozen subs are currently at risk of heading down the same, costly path. “Without mitigation, 15 attack submarines will enter inactive idle time from fiscal year 2026 through fiscal year 2030—during which time the Navy could incur more than 14,000 days of inactive idle time and $3.1 billion in costs to operate and support these inactive submarines,” the GAO found. “The U.S. Navy has not fully evaluated alternative options to more efficiently decommission attack submarines and develop and implement an inactivation plan that could allow them to reduce inactive idle time for crews and save billions.”

well, bit difficult to retire old subs in a timely manner when you’re not producing new ones fast enough to replace them

The report comes just months after the Navy decided to decommission USS Boise, a Los Angeles-class attack submarine, despite spending $1.6 billion on repairs. Last year, Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Daryl Caudle told lawmakers it was “unacceptable”. Over the past decade, the Navy spent about $3.3 billion on idle Los Angeles-class boats, and about $835 million on idle Virginia-class boats—roughly $230,000 for every day a sub sits pierside waiting to be worked on, the report said. The GAO submitted two recommendations: for the Navy to find “alternative options for decommissioning attack submarines,” including defueling outside of drydocks and reducing crewing for those waiting to be taken out of service; and create and execute a detailed plan that reduces inactive idle time. The agency also sent two other recommendations, which DOD deemed sensitive. “The Navy, on behalf of DOD, verbally concurred with the recommendations in this report, but did not provide written comments,” the report said.

The defense industry would likely struggle to rebuild the U.S. military’s crucial space capabilities during a war with China or Russia because it will have too few skilled engineers to do the work, according to a new report from RAND. Today, the country’s space-focused defense companies employ roughly 3 percent of its engineers, and competition for skilled personnel means many jobs go unfilled. If an adversary destroys space-based intelligence, targeting, and communications assets, that shortfall would likely keep the military from getting them back online quickly. “Modern warfare relies on space-based capabilities; therefore, a key question is how quickly then United States can replace those capabilities during a conflict,” the report said. “Although much attention has focused on making these systems more resilient, far less has examined how fast they can be rebuilt after an attack, especially within 12 to 24 months. China and Russia have shown they can threaten or destroy U.S. space assets, potentially weakening U.S. and allied military operations across many domains. In a prolonged conflict, the ability to restore these capabilities on a short timeline could be critical.”

Various commissions have long warned that U.S. dependence on space could become a vulnerability. In recent years, concerns have arisen over Russian and Chinese nuclear anti-satellite weapons. Rebuilding devastated constellations could require more engineers than the country has available, RAND wrote. While recent Space Force and White House initiatives aim to turn the tide, it doesn’t match the demand the administration is putting on the military space industry and, ultimately, more creative solutions are needed to grow that workforce, the report said. “Being able to reconstitute after a conflict is absolutely essential, and that’s not just business as usual for people who are working in the space industry. That’s a massive surge in production,” Alexandra Gerber, the report’s lead author, said in an interview. “Think like World War II, Rosie the Riveter, everybody’s on the line, and this is not just you can teach somebody how to work in a factory after one day. The timelines for creating people to work in the space industry are much much longer than that.

So, we need to be thinking about what the space workforce might need to look like to support reconstitution during a conflict, 10, 20, 30 years in advance. Not just six months.”

hmm, a plan, for several years in advance… like some kind of… N-year plan? hmm, where have I heard that before…

Software development, data analytics, and artificial intelligence will be compete for future engineers, the report said. It can take at least 15 years to develop some of the more highly-skilled, space-focused experts. RAND researchers found “there are approximately 30,000 job openings per year for technicians and technologists, but only 11,000 individuals are credentialed annually. The space industrial base annual demand is approximately 5,000 of the annual openings (17 percent).” For the 244,000 assembly-related job fields hired for annually, there are only 13,000 people credentialed. “The space industrial base constitutes about 11,000 (5 percent) of the annual openings for assemblers, and competition for the 13,000 credentialed workers will be fierce,” the report said. Other major hurdles to growing the talent include security-clearance delays for six months or more, and a limited pool of qualified experts — foreign nationals hold 70 percent of electrical and computer engineering doctorates, making them unavailable from most national security-related work, the report said. Gerbet told Defense One the workforce isn’t needed just for a possible wartime surge. Last month, the White House released a new space transportation policy which aims to reach “more than 1,000 launches and reentries” by 2030. Building new launch infrastructure to meet that demand requires more skilled workers. “We’re currently at about 200 launches per year in the U.S. And they’re talking about timesing that by five, but who are the workers who are going to build all of this infrastructure to support that?,” Gerber said. “Then what happens if there is a conflict on top of that. Then you’re talking about a double surge.”

Last week, President Donald Trump announced plans to create a U.S. Space Academy to “educate and train an entire generation of skilled service members, engineers, and civil operators.” “Think about what the volume throughput of the space academy is likely to be. I mean, you’re only talking about what, a couple hundred graduates a year,” Gerber said. “This is not sufficient, right? I mean, that’s not really happening at a scale that would impact what we’re talking about.” RAND researchers recommended that the Space Force and Pentagon focus new policy on growing workforce development by funding additional internships and vocational, bachelor’s, and advanced degree levels scholarships for science, technology, engineering, and math students, investing in fellowships, and promoting space engineering careers. Researchers said the Space Force should also “allow Reserve Officers’ Training Corps graduates and specialized program scholars to fulfill service obligations by working in qualifying” space defense firms. Additionally, researchers said the defense industry should also look to automation as a supplement to those workforce challenges. “Notably absent from these discussions were mentions of process automation, robotics, or artificial intelligence (AI)–enabled productivity tools as means to reduce the inherent labor intensity of space manufacturing, assembly, integration, and testing,” the report said. “Stakeholders appear to be addressing a structural productivity challenge primarily through volume-based hiring and training strategies and giving little weight to automation as a complementary surge enabler.”

“Due to the relatively short delivery times of 24 to 36 months, better availability, lower prices, openness to industrial cooperation, the European countries Poland, Estonia and the Kingdom of Norway are increasingly deciding to equip themselves with this unique system,” said Croatian Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Ivan Anušić, as quoted in a statement released by the country’s government. The procurement is worth around €544.1 million ($631.9 million). Deliveries to the Croatian military are scheduled for the years 2026 to 2029, according to the statement. Hanwha Aerospace is to supply launchers, ammunition and accompanying equipment to Croatia. The company’s Polish partner, WB Group, will deliver a command-and-control system to connect all components into a single operational unit. Under the plan, the South Korean launchers are to replace the Croatian Army’s outdated Yugoslavia-made M-92 Vulkan and Soviet-designed GRAD BM-21 systems. Anušić said that, alongside the nation’s 2021 purchase of 12 second-hand Dassault Rafale F3-R fighter jets from France, the acquisition marks one of the most important military procurement since the end of Croatia’s independence war in 1995. In December 2024, the Croatian government approved the purchase of eight HIMARS launchers from the United States under a contract worth around $351 million. In the aftermath of the Iran war, the U.S. government has flagged possible delays in deliveries of military gear, including HIMARS ammunition, to a number of countries in the region, triggering concern in capitals on NATO’s eastern flank.

Ukrainian F-16 pilots are facing such a severe shortage of air-to-air missiles that some daytime sorties have seen them rely solely on the fighters’ internal guns to engage Russian aerial threats, according to a journalist who recently spoke with a senior Ukrainian Air Force commander. Meanwhile, the lack of air-to-air missiles means that the available weapons stocks are now being rationed. The disclosure provides a remarkable glimpse into the day-to-day reality of Ukraine’s F-16 operations. While the aircraft may be available, the pilots may be ready, and Russian drones and cruise missiles may be approaching, there may simply not be enough missiles on hand to arm the jets. According to Newsmax journalist Shelby Wilder, the Ukrainian Air Force can find itself monitoring missile shipments as they cross the country’s border, with personnel counting not just the hours but the minutes until those weapons reach the aircraft. The concern is whether the missiles will arrive in time for the next major Russian aerial attack. The Ukrainian commander, who identified himself by the callsign “Phantom” and as commander of the country’s 107th Wing, confirmed the underlying problem when asked directly whether Ukraine was severely short of missiles for its F-16s. “Yes, that’s true. Any aircraft without weapons is … useless,” Phantom said. That blunt assessment is particularly striking given what Ukraine is asking its F-16s to do, and the relentless nature of Russian bombardments against Ukrainian cities and infrastructure.

The fighters have become an important part of Ukraine’s layered air defense network, hunting Russian drones and cruise missiles while also providing a potential counter to Russian combat aircraft, and conducting air-to-ground sorties. Ukraine has operated the F-16 since the summer of 2024. “We are focusing on defending our skies against Russian unmanned drones to protect our infrastructure inside the country,” Phantom said. “Our target priority is cruise missiles.” Destroying as many incoming threats as possible before they reach Ukrainian cities and infrastructure requires missiles, with the F-16 primarily armed with the AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) and the shorter-range AIM-9 Sidewinder. According to the new disclosure, those missiles have become a commodity whose availability can determine how a sortie is flown. The F-16 carries an M61A1 Vulcan 20mm rotary cannon, but using the gun against an aerial target is fundamentally different from engaging it with a missile, and comes with its own risks, as we have explored before. This tactic is especially hazardous when going after small targets and especially slow ones, and it becomes even more dangerous at night. Ukraine has already demonstrated that its F-16s can use their guns in combat. In May 2025, the Ukrainian Air Force said an F-16 pilot had destroyed three aerial targets and was engaging a fourth with the aircraft cannon before an emergency forced him to eject.

One air-to-air weapon not mentioned by Phantom is the laser-guided 70mm Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System II (APKWS II) rocket, now apparently also part of the arsenal. These rockets would offer the Ukrainian Air Force an extremely valuable, lower-cost option for engaging drones and subsonic cruise missiles. Regardless, Phantom specifically called for additional air-to-air missiles, as well as interceptors for ground-based Patriot batteries. “We require more means of protection, such as Patriot missiles and air-to-air missiles, AIM-9s or AIM-120s to our fleet,” he said. Phantom’s message is that simply delivering more aircraft is not enough. Ukraine needs a sustainable weapons pipeline to keep those aircraft combat-effective. This is increasingly becoming a wider problem across Ukraine’s air defense network. Patriot interceptors have been heavily consumed, with relatively few replacement missiles now trickling in, leaving Ukraine with limited ability to defend against ballistic missiles in particular. The strain is now spilling into the lower tiers, including the air-to-air missiles carried by F-16s. Ukraine’s continued consumption of interceptors is a major driver, but it is competing with the enormous demand generated by ongoing wars in the Middle East and a broader surge in demand for advanced air defense weapons around the world. With production struggling to keep pace, scarce interceptors are effectively being rationed across an increasingly crowded global battlefield. “At least we need to try to increase the production, or at least to allow Ukraine to localize the production in Ukraine or other European countries,” he said.

That proposal reflects the fundamental vulnerability of a relatively small fleet operating in a high-intensity air war. Every missile fired at a Russian cruise missile or drone is one less available for the next engagement. A finite inventory therefore has to cover both routine air-defense missions and the possibility of much larger Russian attacks. At the same time, both the AIM-9 and especially the AIM-120 are used for Ukrainian ground-based air defenses too. The AMRAAM, in particular, is the effector for the NASAMS, which protects Kyiv, and other key objectives against cruise missiles and drones. The problem becomes even more acute because Ukraine cannot know precisely when the next major Russian strike will arrive. That is why, according to Wilder’s account, the arrival of missile shipments is being followed with extraordinary urgency. At the same time, Phantom welcomed the major technological leap that the F-16 represents over the Soviet-designed MiG-29s and Su-27s that formed the backbone of Ukraine’s fighter force. “The F-16s in comparison with the legacy aircraft like MiG-29 or Su-27? This is kind of like a new technology,” Phantom said. But sophisticated aircraft are only as useful as the weapons available to them. Ukrainian F-16s have reportedly destroyed huge numbers of Russian drones and cruise missiles, and in July a Ukrainian F-16 was publicly identified by the U.S. Joint Chiefs chairman as having shot down a Russian fighter. Phantom also asked Ukraine’s Western partners to think beyond individual weapons transfers and toward production capacity.

He also urged the United States and European countries to do more to prevent Russia from acquiring components used in its own missile production through third party countries. “We need to make as much as we can to stop providing the parts, most technological parts to Russians, bypassing the direct sales, of course, through the third party,” he said. Phantom argued that Russia continues to obtain sophisticated components through intermediaries and even ostensibly civilian products. “It would not be a surprise that Russians [are] using the washing machine that they’re buying from the third party to use those smart details for building missiles,” he said. His recommendation is tighter sanctions and enforcement designed to cut off Russia’s access to those components. “Important is to sanction to stop Russia from being able to have access to those parts,” he said. That, combined with missile shortages, could become an even bigger problem when Russia conducts another major aerial campaign against Ukraine, particularly as Moscow traditionally intensifies attacks against the country’s energy infrastructure during the winter months.